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Imagine if someone told you that they would take away half of
everything you earned this year if you did not catch the misconduct of one of
your employees.' You would most likely be highly motivated to catch the
misconduct. This is exactly what Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
does. Or, at least, that is what it is supposed to do.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20022 (Sarbanes-Oxley) was an expansive
reaction to widespread scandal and to the market's perceived lack of
corporate accountability.3 One of the strongest incentives contained in this
Act is Section 304, which provides for the forfeiture of an entire year's
bonuses and incentive compensation received by the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), whenever corporate
misconduct results in the filing of a restatement.4 This provision puts the
* J.D. Candidate at Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University. I would like
to give thanks to Robert J. Kheel and Arnold S. Jacobs for introducing me to the topic of
this Article, and to my family and friends for all their love and support. I would
especially like to thank my fianc6 David for always encouraging me to pursue my
dreams.
I See Special Report: Executive Pay 2004, USATODAY, May 20, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2004-ceo-pay-salary-chart.htm
(last visited Oct. 11, 2008) (looking at the total compensation received by the CEOs at
the top 225 revenue producing companies). This data shows that 217 out of the 225 CEOs
receive more than 70% of their yearly compensation from sources other than salary. Id.
That 70% is subject to disgorgement under Section 304.
2 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
3 Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing
Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 321-23 (2007).
4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, states:
§ 304. Forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits
(a) Additional Compensation Prior to Noncompliance with Commission
Financial Reporting Requirements
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the
material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial
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onus on the executives to go beyond passive observation and actively search
out potential sources of fraud and misconduct by imposing on them a
personal penalty for failure to discover misconduct.5 It also creates one of the
strongest incentives to accomplish the direct goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Legislation-corporate transparency and disclosure.6 If enforcement actions
under this provision could increase corporate compliance, why is it that such
action has been taken in only a handful of cases since its inception? 7
This Note will attempt to answer this very question by searching for the
systemic source of the problem, and exploring possible barriers to efficient
enforcement. Part II will address the history and purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley
and argue that Congress intended to create an affirmative duty to seek out
corporate misconduct through the enactment of Section 304. Part III of this
Note will address the operation of Section 304. Part III.A attempts to resolve
the ambiguity in the language of the statute in order to provide a clear
framework against which to analyze current enforcement statistics. Part III.B
explores the lack of enforcement actions brought under Section 304, to date.
Part IV proposes several explanations as to why the enforcement under this
Section is so low. Part V looks at two proposed amendments to Section 304
and analyzes the effect that the proposed changes would have if enacted.
reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief
financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for-
(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received
by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public
issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial
document embodying such financial reporting requirement; and
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-
month period.
(b) Commission Exemption Authority
The Commission may exempt any person from the application of subsection
(a), as it deems necessary and appropriate.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006).
5 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915, 955-57 (2003).
6 Will SOX 304 Spoil the Appetites of Innocent Executives? Misconduct,
Disgorgement and the SEC, in 3 PLI's COMPLIANCE COUNSELOR (Practising Law
Institute No. 40, 2006) (describing the Section as "a mighty powerful tool"). Cf Scott De
Carlo, Executive Pay: Big Paychecks, FORBES, May 3, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/
2007/05/03/ceo-executive-compensation-lead-07ceo-cx sd 0503ceocompensationintro.
html (last visited Oct. 19, 2008) ("The chief executives of America's 500 biggest
companies got a collective 38% pay raise last year, to $7.5 billion. That's an average
$15.2 million apiece. Exercised stock options again account for the main component of
pay, 48%.").
7 See infra Part III.B.
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Finally, Part VI puts forth recommendations for clarifying Section 304 and
for reaching optimal enforcement under this provision.
II. THE HISTORY OF SARBANES-OXLEY AND SECTION 304
It is a basic assumption of securities law that mandatory disclosure
of all material information is necessary if the public market is going to
correctly value and freely trade in securities. 8 Whether one agrees with
this assumption,9 once the market was designed to function on the
principle of total information, the regulations and enforcement
procedure must ensure that total information is received. 10 Along these
lines, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 mandates that every
publicly traded company file annual and quarterly reports," the
purpose of which is to allow both current and potential investors
access to information on the health of the company, or other
information that might have an effect on their evaluations of a
security. 12
A. The Origins of Sarbanes-Oxley
A series of corporate scandals first brought to the public's attention a
flaw in the system that allowed corporate officers to withhold, misrepresent
or downright lie to the public about essential information. 13 The widespread
8 See TERENCE SHEPPEY & Ross MCGILL, SARBANES-OXLEY: BUILDING WORKING
STRATEGIES FOR COMPLIANCE 10-11 (2007) (discussing the "information economy").
9 It has been proposed that heavy regulation creates inefficiency in the market and
that if there were no regulations "rational cost-benefit analysis" would drive internal
controls and disclosures and the market could price the risk of misinformation. HENRY N.
BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE'VE
LEARNED; HOW TO Fix IT 23-25 (Michael S. Greve ed., 2006).
10 Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in the
Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 778 (citation omitted) ('[a]
fundamental purpose, common to these [federal securities] statutes, was to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a
high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."').
11 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006).
12 See SHEPPEY & MCGILL, supra note 8, at 78.
13 See SHEPPEY & MCGILL, supra note 8, at 7; GUY P. LANDER, WHAT IS SARBANES-
OXLEY? 1 (McGraw-Hill 2004) (identifying the "corporate giants like Enron, Global
Crossing, and WorldCom ... forced to declare bankruptcy" and the "massive accounting
and other irregularities" at Adelphi Communications and other companies as the source
of the "public outcry").
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media frenzy, covering everything from embezzlement to insider trading, 14
caused the general public to fear that the information disclosed to the market
was not sufficiently truthful or dependable. The concern became that
investors had lost confidence in the market and would pull their money out of
the market, leading to an economic downturn if something was not done to
fix the problem.' 5
Congress's reaction (or overreaction 16) to the perceived decrease in
investor confidence' 7 was the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. 18 Previous
legislation has been proposed to "deter . . . market abuse which threatens
investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of [the] capital markets by
undermining the public's expectations of honest and fair securities markets
where all participants play by the same rules."'19 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
was no different in this respect. Congress sought "[t]o protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws."20 It sought to accomplish greater
14 Media coverage that was "unrelentingly negative on business" may have
exaggerated the problem through excessive attention. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9,
at 10.
15 See 148 CoNG. REC. H4357 (July 9, 2002) (statement of Rep. Inslee) ("[T]here
has been so much malfeasance [and] ... this has created a substantial lack of confidence
in our capital markets system. It is clear that we have a very systemic problem we have
got to fix."); 148 CONG. REc. E1451 (July 25, 2002) (Conf. Rep., Extension of Remarks)
(statement of Rep. Sununu) ("Americans, have watched the stock market tumble as
accounting scandals have shaken investor confidence.").
16 Many have commented that Sarbanes-Oxley was a poorly drafted, and hastily
executed, regulation that did more harm to the market than good. See BUTLER &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 100; SHEPPEY & McGILL, supra note 8, at 19 ("An underlying
issue for many.., is the concern that the industry is being over-regulated as a reaction to
perceived failures of processes and controls within individual firms, rather than
widespread systemic issues requiring regulatory control."); Thuy-Nga T. Vo, Lifting the
Curse of the SOX Through Employee Assessments of the Internal Control Environment,
56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (characterizing Sarbanes-Oxley as a "curse" on the
business community).
17 The SEC has pointed to Sarbanes-Oxley as a means of providing the public "with
a materially accurate and complete picture of an issuer's financial condition." Final Rule
and Request for Comments; Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and
Annual Reports Progression and Development, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249,
270, 274 (2006).
18 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. & 18 U.S.C.).
19 See Marc I. Steinberg & Ralph C. Ferrara, Securities Practice: Federal and State
Enforcement, 25 Sec. L. Ser. (West) app. 2D, at 2-177 (2004) (Statement of Senator
Sarbanes, excerpt from debate over Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984).
20 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (2006). See
also Oleg Rezzy, Sarbanes-Oxley: Progressive Punishment for Regressive Victimization,
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transparency by mandating extensive auditing, internal monitoring
compliance procedures and by attaching liability to company executives
responsible for financial disclosure. 21 It was not the goal, but the means of
accomplishing that goal-the statutorily mandated procedures-that made
this legislation so noteworthy.
It was not just increased disclosure of information that was needed, since
mandatory disclosure was not a new concept in the realm of securities.22
Rather, it was a measure of accountability in the form of a designated person
to root out wrongdoing, which was lacking from prior enforcement
mechanisms.23 Hoping to increase the accuracy of periodic filings, Congress
enacted the certification requirement of Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley. 24
"[T]he provision .. .requires the CEOs and CFOs of public companies to
personally certify that the reports their companies file with the Commission
are both accurate and complete." 25 The goal was to give the market a
44 Hous. L. REv. 95, 98 (2007) ("Sarbanes-Oxley put forth numerous provisions
targeting existing governance and financial reporting weaknesses.. . . Its
provisions... mandated director independence ... improved the dissemination and
disclosure of material financial and organizational information, and sought to deter future
fraud with stiffer criminal sanctions and greater senior executive responsibility.").
21 148 CONG. REc. E1451 (July 25, 2002) (Conf. Rep., Extension of Remarks)
(statement of Rep. Sununu) ("Our action today will inform executives that their actions
will be scrutinized, with the threat of real penalties for violations of their legal
responsibilities . . . This conference report ... includes key provisions ... that will
improve disclosure, impose tougher penalties, and better protect investors in such cases
of fraud.").
22 A publicly traded company was required to file quarterly and annual reports under
either Section 13 or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Robert M.
Mattson, Jr. & Tamara Powell Tate, Periodic Reporting Requirements, 1-4 Federal
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (MB) § 4.02 (2008); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§§ 13, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (2006).
23 See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 25 (2002) ("The Committee believes that
management should be held responsible for the financial representations of their
companies. The bill therefore clearly establishes that CEOs and CFOs are responsible for
the presentation of material in their company's financial reports."). Many called for
punishment as a means of accountability, and some even desired to "impose the sternest
criminal sanctions on the corporate people and accountants who failed to abide by their
responsibilities.., we need CEOs to have to certify their financial records so that they
are personally responsible." 148 CONG. REc. H4357 (July 9, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Inslee).
24 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006).
25 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Prepares to Implement Sarbanes-
Oxley Act Requirement for CEO and CFO Certification of SEC Filings, SEC Press
Release No. 2002-119 (Aug. 2, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-
1 19.htm.
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designated ally whose duty it was to put a stop to the corruption. But what
use is creating a duty without a penalty to motivate one to fulfill that duty?
B. The Expansion of Responsibility and Liability under Section 304
Sarbanes-Oxley sought to increase reporting accuracy by increasing the
accountability of those responsible for the disclosures. 26 Section 304 is one
of many enforcement provisions designed to increase internal investigation
and create a penalty for inaccurate or incomplete reports.27 In that respect,
Section 302 and Section 304 are two sides of the same coin. Whereas Section
302 creates the incentive for the CEO and CFO to ensure accuracy by
attaching liability to their signature, Section 304 creates a penalty for failure
to discover corporate misconduct by directly targeting bonuses and incentive
based compensation of the CEO and CFO.28 While Section 304 does not
directly punish a false signing like Section 906,29 it is still operationally
consistent with the duty to obtain all material information about the company
and ensure it is accurate and not misleading before issuing the report.30
26 See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud A
Critique of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CoRP. L. 1, 3 (2002) ("The only
effective antidotes to fraud are active and vigilant markets and professionals with strong
incentives to investigate corporate managers and dig up corporate information.").
271d. at 17-18.
28 Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006), with
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006).
29 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
30 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006) for the basis of
the duty to investigate:
§ 7241(a)(2): based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading;
§ 7241(a)(3): based on such officer's knowledge, the financial
statements... fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report;
§ 7241 (a)(4)(B): the signing officers... have designed such internal controls to
ensure that material information relating to the issuer ... is made known to such
officers... particularly during the period in which the periodic reports are being
prepared[.]
This can be read to say the officer is tasked with the knowledge of collecting all
"material information" related to the company and certifying based on all the information
collected that he has not made any false or misleading statement. This is supported by the
fact that he must also disclose any problem in the system that might prevent him from
being able to accurately disclose the true state of the company's financials. Sarbanes-
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Working in tandem, these two provisions place pressure on the CEO and the
CFO to actively investigate, effectively forcing them to ensure that no
misconduct is present within the company. 31
This approach of an affirmative duty to investigate is consistent with past
judicial reasoning that rejected the so called "'good soldier' defense" 32 and
"ignorance" defense.33 The penalty for false certification is outlined under
Section 906, which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 193434 to
impose an additional civil penalty.35 In doing so, it used familiar language,
added clarifying amendments, and specifically referenced the section of the
code that had to be violated.36 Congress did not choose to add any of these
features to the text of Section 304, potentially so that it could create a new
standard of liability. 37 Additionally, the language of Section 304 seems to
Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a)(4)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)-(5) (2006). See Paul H.
Dawes & Michele D. Johnson, The Disgorgement Mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley Section
304: Do They Reach Innocent CEOs and CFOs?, in SECURITIES LITIGATION &
ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2006, at 116 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 8805 2006). See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 401, 404, 15
U.S.C. §§ 7261, 7262 (2006).
31 Cunningham, supra note 5, at 956 ("Keeping the heat on the CEO and CFO... is
a novel and proportionate penal scheme, intended to destroy what many saw as one part
of the incentives for manipulation in the first place. This is also intended to discourage
poor accounting treatments that are the product of mere haste, bad judgment, or other
carelessness.").
32 This failure to satisfy an affirmative duty is illustrated in In re Maury where
Maury, a Controller, "implement[ed] ... directions which he knew or should have known
were improper ... [and] failed to take adequate steps to satisfy himself that the
accounting practices ... were correct, and that the disclosures made by senior
management were accurate." Marc I. Steinberg & Ralph C. Ferrara, Securities Practice:
Federal and State Enforcement, 25 Sec. L. Ser. (West) § 2:23, at 2-61 (2004) (citing In re
Maury, AAER-93, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,493 (Mar. 26, 1986).
33 Cunningham, supra note 5, at 955-56, states:
These provisions look to prevent CEOs and CFOs from hiding behind the defense of
ignorance. The clear line of provenance points to the Enron scandal amid which several
senior executives testified before Congress that they lacked knowledge of underling
financial fraud, contending that they couldn't possibly be aware of all activities, including
fraudulent practices, within the massive company.
34 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
35 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
36 Id. at § 906(a)-(b).
37 See Stephen Fraidin, Andrew M. Genser & Daniel S. Hoverman, Payback:
Disgorging Bonuses, Equity and Incentive-Based Compensation Under Sarbanes-Oxley's
Section 304, 2 INT'L J. OF DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 52, 54 (2005) (discussing Section
304's "apparent introduction of... sweeping features [as marking] a radical break from
the traditional approach to securities enforcement "). Congress may have intended to
remove Section 304 from consideration under any formerly familiar legal standard.
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reject 38 the Section 302 certification standard of "knowingly" or "based on
my knowledge" 39 in favor of the broader standard of corporate responsibility:
an affirmative duty of acquiring relevant knowledge.
An affirmative standard would also be consistent with the broader SEC
purpose--"protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the
security."'40 Allowing a CEO to claim ignorance of fraud in the company
seems to be in direct contradiction to his Section 302 mandate to set up
"internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the issuer...
is made known to such officers." 41 Those controls "provide reasonable
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation
of financial statements." 42 Because the CEO and CFO are charged with
implementing these controls43 in order to aid them in acquiring all "material
information," 44 it would seem that internal fraud or misconduct would be the
type of knowledge they are charged with acquiring, possessing, and
correcting.45
The original idea for this section came when "President George Bush
announced a ten-point plan to improve corporate responsibility .... One of
the President's proposals was to disallow CEOs and other officers of
corporations to profit from erroneous financial statements." 46 As phrased,
3 8 See John P. Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Case for a
Personal Culpability Requirement, 59 Bus. LAW. 1005, 1017-19, 1024-26 (2004)
(explaining that in choosing the Senate version over the House version they rejected the
requirement to "'identify the scienter requirement') (citations omitted).
39 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006).
40 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2006).
41 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(4)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(4)(B) (2006).
42 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,667 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
43 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006).
44Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006). See supra
discussion note 26.
45 Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302(a)(5) states that the certifier must disclose to the
auditors "any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the issuer's internal controls" presumably
because it would signal "material weaknesses in internal controls" and therefore prevent
the issuer from correctly identifying or representing material information. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(5)(B), (A), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(5)(B), (A) (2006). If the CEO or
CFO is already supposed to know of any fraud or deficiency that might prevent him from
getting the accurate information then it seems entirely reasonable to punish them when
they did not acquire the knowledge the law dictated that they should have already
acquired.
46 Harold S. Bloomenthal, SEC Disgorgement Strengthened and/or Opportunities
for Plaintiffs' Lawyers?, 25 SEC. & FED. CoRP. L. (West) No. 1, at 4 (Jan. 2003). See also
H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 50 (2002) ("to require disgorgement of incentive-based
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this proposal was consistent with the policy of disgorgement that was already
present in many securities regulations. 47 "'[T]he primary purpose of
disgorgement is not to compensate investors. Unlike damages, it is a method
of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly
enriched."' 48 The final language of Section 304 was added to the Act during
a conference committee session,49 replacing language reported out of
committee that only would have tasked the SEC to investigate the matter.50
The language eventually enacted by Congress expands on the originally
intended application. 51
Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted, the traditional causes of
action contained either a knowledge element or liability for direct action.52 A
cause of action under Section 304 appears to have neither a knowledge
compensation from officers and directors in cases of false or misleading statements made
by such officers that required an accounting restatement.").
47 See, e.g., Bloomenthal, supra note 46, at 4. The SEC brought action against the
Rigas for "fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions of material fact... [seeking]
disgorgement of any and all compensation.., before the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley;
hence, it is clear that the Commission assumed it had authority to expand the
disgorgement remedy in this fashion." Id.
48 SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing SEC v. Commonwealth
Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978)).
49 H.R. REP. No. 107-610, at 35 (2002) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 542, 542.
50 Representative Oxley felt the language of the bill reported out of committee was
not strong enough with respect to disgorgement. See H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 50 (2002)
("Instead of attempting to implement this straightforward and common sense proposal
[the president's proposal], the Committee simply tasked the SEC to study the question of
disgorgement.").
51 Bloomenthal posits that the disgorgement authority of Section 304 was intended
to expand beyond the Commission's already existing authority. See Bloomenthal, supra
note 46, at 4-5 ("For years, the Commission, in civil actions, typically
sought... disgorgement of ill-gotten gains... [t]here does not appear to be a need for
any additional authority ... Why then, the provisions of Section 304... ?").
52 See Kelsh, supra note 38, at 1024-27 ("[T]he pre-Sarbanes-Oxley liability
provisions in the federal securities laws may profitably be divided into three categories:
(i) Those that impose liability on a person for an action that he or she has taken, but
provide a defense based on the person's state of mind with respect to the action. . .. (ii)
Those that impose liability on a person for an action that he or she has taken, but do not
provide a defense based on the person's state of mind with respect to the action.... (iii)
Those that impose liability on a person for actions that others have taken, but that provide
a defense based on the person's state of mind with respect to the actions of such other
person.").
2009]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
requirement, nor an intent requirement.53 A literal reading of Section 304
actually expands the duties and responsibilities of the CEO and CFO; it holds
them liable for any misconduct that might lead to a restatement, not just their
own.54 Therefore, the Section 304 provision instituted a strict penalty for
failure to discover corporate misconduct,55 not just to deprive one who had
been "unjustly enriched." Given that at the time of enactment many members
of Congress were responding to the popular media bias and prominent
political rhetoric that all CEOs were crooks;56 it is not surprising that such a
penalty would have found popular support. 57
The inattentive liability standard is a significant change from the pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley law, 58 which only allowed an individual's compensation to
be targeted if it was a result of his own misconduct. 59 The final language of
53 Fraidin et al., supra note 37, at 54 ("Section 304... goes beyond other
provisions ... [which require] false certification knowingly... regardless of wrongful
intent [and] without any fault").
54 Ribstein, supra note 26, at 17-18 ("It... penalizes fraud by requiring the return
of incentive based compensation or profits from stock sales following accounting
restatements resulting from 'misconduct' whether or not by the executive whose
compensation or profits had to be returned."); Paul H. Dawes & Kory Sorrell, Stock
Options: Past Practices and Narrowing Choices Amid the Backdating Scandal, WALL
STREET LAWYER (West Legalworks, New York, NY), Sept. 2006, at 5 ("Sarbanes-Oxley
appears to provide for strict liability of the CFO and CEO, even if they were not guilty of
the misconduct leading to the restatement.").
55 Fraidin et al., supra note 37, at 53-54 ("Read literally, Section 304 imposes strict
liability on CEOs and CFOs.").
56 148 CONG. REc. H4472-73 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Rep. Ganske)
("[T]oday the foundation of personal integrity has been eroded by the lure of huge
personal profits... I think that the rule of law requires that those CEOs who have
committed malfeasance, who are no better than street thugs, should spend time in jail.").
See also Cory L. Braddock, Comment, Penny Wise, Pound Foolish: Why Investors would
be Foolish to Pay a Penny or a Pound for the Protections Provided by Sarbanes-Oxley,
2006 BYU L. REv. 175, 189 (2006).
57 148 CONG. REC. H5462, H5464 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner discussing H.R. REP. No. 107-610 (2002) (Conf. Rep.)) ("I said the best
way to do that is to punish the corporate wrongdoers and to punish them harshly. .. the
conference committee report before us today accomplishes that goal."); Kelsh, supra note
38, at 1022 ("That some of these officers may have been unaware of the extent of the
fraud at the companies they lead only served to exacerbate, not alleviate, the outrage.").
58 Kelsh, supra note 38, at 1010 ("If. . . misconduct on the part of any person can
give rise to liability for the CEO and CFO... then section 304 will turn out to be a
revolutionary development in the securities laws... ").
59 See Bloomenthal, supra note 46, at 4-5 ("What is different about these cases is
that they involve financial fraud by public companies and the disgorgement sought is not
funds received from investors but bonuses, other compensation received from the
company"); Jeannie Nelson, Comment, New Corporate Responsibility Law Increases
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Section 304 is missing the critical element of harm, allowing the mere
occurrence of a restatement due to misconduct to be enough to trigger
disgorgement, 60 ironically creating the potential to subject the executives to
disgorgement even if the restatement has a positive impact on the value of
the security. 61 However, merely characterizing the statute as a penalty for
failure to discover all corporate misconduct ignores several ambiguities in
the statutory text that could wholly change the interpretation of this section.
III. THE INTERPRETATION AND OPERATION OF SECTION 304
In order to analyze the effectiveness and enforcement under Section 304,
one must first address its intended operation and function. Part III.A will
look at the ambiguous language of the text of Section 304 and will attempt to
resolve the ambiguity with the most logical construction. Only after
addressing the ambiguities, and attempting to resolve them with their most
likely implications, can one even begin to address the lack of action brought
under this provision. On the issue of a private right of action, Part III.A.4 of
this Note defers to the holdings of the federal courts, which have
unanimously ruled that there is no private right of action under Section 304.
Part III.B will address the SEC's overall lack of enforcement actions brought
under Section 304. Finally, Part III.C will look at the five cases in which the
SEC has brought a Section 304 cause of action and attempt to identify
similarities between the cases to see if it is suggestive of a trend in
enforcement.
A. The Ambiguous Language of 304 (What Happens When You Rush)
Statutory canons dictate that interpretation of a statute should start with
the text of the act itself.62 Unfortunately, the text of Section 304 raises
Liabilities for Directors, Officers, and Attorneys, but Does It Increase Protections for
Investors?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1165, 1196 (2003) ("the Act reduces the protections
that were once provided by the corporate veil doctrine").
60 10 ROBERT J. WILD, DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITIES COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
§ 1:152 (2007).
61 Cf John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 312-13 (2004) ("Not all
restatements... are equal. Some may... involve only trivial changes or... could
simply be the product of changes in regulatory rules and could signify relatively little.").
62 See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("[I]n
interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all
others... courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there."); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976) (citation omitted) ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself.").
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several problems of interpretation due to poor drafting and ambiguous
language. 63 Section 304, Forfeiture of Certain Bonuses and Profits, states:
(a) Additional Compensation Prior to Noncompliance with
Commission Financial Reporting Requirements. - If an issuer is required
to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of
the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting
requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief
financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for-
(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation
received by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period
following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission
(whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such
financial reporting requirement; and
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during
that 12-month period.
(b) Commission Exemption Authority. - The Commission may
exempt any person from the application of subsection (a), as it deems
necessary and appropriate. 64
While at first glance the language seems straightforward, it is actually
unclear in regard to many areas of implementation. Its first problem is the
total failure of the drafters to define "misconduct," the triggering threshold
for imposition of liability. 65 Second, it fails to either differentiate between the
responsibility of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial
Officer (CFO), or specifically include both as liable for misconduct resulting
in a restatement.66 Third, some have argued that the language defining the
types of instruments covered by forfeiture is vague, making calculation of the
amount of disgorgement very difficult. 67 Finally, while designating
exemption authority, it fails to specify the enforcing authority or who is
specifically permitted to bring a cause of action.68
63 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT,
AND PREVENTION § 10:10.50 (2007). See also Ramirez, supra note 3, at 323-24 (noting
problems with hasty enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and the resulting poorly drafted
legislation).
64 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006).
6 5 See Dawes & Johnson, supra note 30, at 113.
66 See WILD, supra note 60, at § 1: 152.
67 Fraidin et al., supra note 37, at 60-61.
6 8 See Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 652 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
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1. "Misconduct": Congress's Failure to Be Specific
Section 304 "was a late addition to the legislation, and hardly is a model
of clear drafting." 69 The whole section is triggered by the need to issue a
restatement due to "misconduct," yet nowhere in the Act does Congress
define the term.70 First, "[t]his forfeiture provision does not provide specifics
as to the meaning or degree of actionable misconduct" and second, "does not
require that the misconduct be committed by the CEO and the CFO who are
subject to the forfeiture." 71 Under the current language, it is conceivable that
even the most diligent executive, who strives to find any hint of corporate
misconduct, might still be subject to the disgorgement through no fault of his
own.
72
It is the "misconduct" that triggers the disgorgement, "not [just] the mere
decision to restate financial reports," but the text does not specify the degree
of misconduct.73 The language when reported out of the committee in the
House set the threshold at "extreme misconduct," but the "extreme" qualifier
was specifically rejected in the final draft, causing the triggering threshold to
be lower than that originally purposed.74 However, this does not resolve the
threshold level of misconduct, and thus the requisite elements of a 304 cause
of action are unclear. Can "negligent errors ... be sufficient to trigger the
disgorgement provision[?] '' 75 It appears that the restatement must be due to
someone's misconduct, "something more than a mistake," 76 that rises to the
level of intent to act in a manner inconsistent with the securities laws and
filing requirements. But, this reveals the second point of ambiguity, since it is
not the CEO or the CFO that has to make that conscious choice of non-
compliance. 77 Thus, while someone in the company must be intentionally
acting, the text seems to sever the intent to act from the punishment.
Reading the text in this manner is consistent with the goal of the
legislation, to create an affirmative duty to acquire knowledge about the
69 LANGEVOORT, supra note 63, at § 10:10.50.
70 Dawes & Johnson, supra note 30, at 113.
71 WILD, supra note 60, at §1:152.
72 Dawes & Johnson, supra note 30, at 114 ("[T]he Act's silence as to the source of
the misconduct that triggers disgorgement could be interpreted as an indication that the
disgorgement mandate reaches even innocent and diligent company executives.").
73 In Re AFC Enters., Inc. Derivative Litig., 224 F.R.D. 515, 521 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
74 Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 656 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("'extreme
misconduct' ... [e]stablishing such a high standard will make it very difficult, if not
impossible, for the commission to obtain disgorgement"). See also H.R. REP. No. 107-
414 (2002).
75 Dawes & Johnson, supra note 30, at 116.
7 6 1d
77 Kelsh, supra note 38, at 10 15-16.
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company and to seek out misconduct. Such an application is consistent with
the President's proposal as well as the statutory purpose.78 Given that most of
the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions are targeted at catching corporate fraud, it
would be consistent with the holistic purpose of the legislation to presume
that Congress was attempting to incentivize executives to actively seek out
the fraud. 79 The punishment is imposed because executives failed to do their
jobs, i.e. ensure the financial integrity of the company and the accuracy of
the financial disclosures, so it is entirely logical that the deprivation of
benefits is due not to their own personal misconduct, but their failure to pay
attention and investigate. 80 The forfeiture provision should be read as a
punishment for inattentive CEOs that fail to catch the misconduct happening
within their corporations. 81
However, "[t]his provision focuses on material noncompliance with
financial reporting requirements, without a requirement that the restatement
be adverse. ' 82 The lack of harm caused by the misconduct would not be
inconsistent with the characterization of this provision as a strict liability
penalty.83 In the case of a strict liability standard, it is not the executives'
78 Dawes & Johnson, supra note 30, at 114.
79 SHEPPEY & MCGILL, supra note 8, at 78 ("In addressing reliability of reports, the
Act seeks to ensure good practical corporate behavior... [with] emphasis placed on
senior executives. Financial reports, interim and final, are the stuff of their world. It is
they who are directly associated with these statements. ... [and] [i]t is they who are
directly tasked with ensuring transparency, and it is they who are penalized for
failures.").
80 Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward:
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REv. 1, 29
(2007) ("If executives are truly to have an incentive to manage a company ethically, they
should forfeit pay when material noncompliance happens on their watch.").
81 One scholar argues that "[o]ne could also imagine circumstances in which the
'misconduct' is on the part of a lower level employee, and that it is patently unreasonable
to assume that the chief executive officer or chief financial officer would be able to
discover or control such conduct." Stanton P. Eigenbrodt, The Chilling Effects of
Disgorgement and a Temporary Freeze: Sarbanes-Oxley Sections 304 and 1103, 2004
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS 2, available at http://media.gibsondunn.com/fstore/
documents/pubs/Eigenbrodt 5 2004.pdf. However, misconduct that created a situation
which can trigger a restatement is unlikely to be committed by such a low-level employee
and not be identified by the intemal controls. If such an occurrence happens, this author
argues that it would be the result of either a deficiency in the control or fraud by a party
involved in the intemal control system, both of which the CEO and CFO are required to
identify under Section 302. See discussion supra Part II.B.
82 WILD, supra note 60, at § 1:152.
83 Peter L. Welsh, Courts Deny Plaintiffs' Lawyers a Role in Enforcing Sarbanes-
Oxley Section 304, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 13, 2006, available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/O1306LBWelsh.pdf (Section 304 "was intended to provide a
nearly automatic mechanism for compelling... [a CEO and CFO] to disgorge bonuses,
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indifference or passive certification that is targeted, it is the failure to find the
fraud that is punished, regardless of how much time, effort, or money was
invested in the investigation. 84 Such a reading of the provision would
certainly create a strong incentive for executives to truly investigate what
was transpiring within their corporations. 85
However, by using the strict liability interpretation, several negative
outcomes could result. First, there is such a thing as being too careful. It is
entirely conceivable that dutiful executives would spend excessive amounts
of time and corporate resources to ensure the absences of misconduct, well
beyond any reasonable cost-benefit analysis.86 Second, tying the incentive to
the personal compensation of the executives could force them to put their
own motivation to retain their earnings above what is in the best interest of
the company.87 Finally, such a reading also creates large personal risk for
executives, potentially resulting in a significant increase in the cost of
directors' and officers' insurance, or the possibility that talented officers will
equity gains, and other incentive-based compensation"). See also David A. Westbrook, In
the Wake of Corporate Reform: One Year in the Life of Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 441, 449 (2004) ("Unlike fraud, failure to meet one's reporting obligations is
illegal regardless of whether any investor was actually misled or even injured.").
84 Fraidin et al., supra note 37, at 53-54 ("Section 304 imposes strict liability... in
amounts that bear no logical relation to the scope of misconduct or to the harm inflicted
on others... liability that a covered officer cannot avoid even by the strictest adherence
to the securities laws."). In this respect the Section 304 standard is similar to some states'
absolute standard for statutory rape: the law does not care if a man asked for the girl's
driver's license, birth certificate, and passport, and she looked 25. If she was under the
age of consent, he would still be guilty. See, e.g., State v. Berry, 117 N.H. 352 (N.H.
1977) ("Our statutory rape statutes have always applied to those under the age of consent
regardless of their maturity and the fact that a female's apparent maturity may mislead a
man into believing she is older than sixteen has been no defense.")
85 Cf Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors'
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REv. 393, 448 (2005-2006) ("[T]he
market may provide a strong incentive to... publish overly optimistic news while
ignoring red flags and failing to scrutinize... conduct. Because of this incentive, our
corporate governance system needs legal sanctions to serve as a countervailing force,
pressuring directors to pay heed to their fiduciary responsibility of
ensuring ... disclosure."). Section 304 creates the similar "countervailing force" in the
case of officers. Id.
86 BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 49, 58-59. Cf William J. Carney, The Costs
of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private," 55 EMORY L.J. 141
(2006) ("All internal control systems can be defeated by a conspiracy among employees
to commit fraud, so section 404 becomes a due diligence standard rather than antifraud
protection."). If an executive is required to use due diligence in his efforts to search for
misconduct, then due diligence should also become an affirmative defense to Section 304
actions.
87 BUTLER & RIBsTEIN, supra note 9, at 49, 58-59.
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find the risk too high and simply choose not to work for publicly traded
companies. 88 Ironically, this could deter the savviest businessmen-those
who would be most likely to catch the fraud or misconduct-from accepting
the position.89 Therefore, the strict liability reading would fail to accomplish
the goals of the Act.
The alternative interpretation, the direct liability or personal culpability
interpretation, where the disgorgement would be tied only to misconduct
committed by the CEOs and CFOs, would be consistent with the default
condition before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley 90 where one had to show
both fault and harm to seek disgorgement of an executive's compensation,
similar to an action for insider trading.91 Many academics have rejected this
interpretation on the grounds that if such an action could have been brought
before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, then the language of Section 304 is
rendered entirely superfluous. 92
88 Id. at 51-53.
89 Compare Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177, 17 C.F.R. Pts. 228, 229 & 249 (Jan. 24,
2003) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/fmal/33-8177.htm (extensive discussion on
"financial expert" requirement), with David McCann, Why is CFO Turnover So High?,
CFO MAGAZINE, Feb. 29, 2008, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfin/10789703?f=insidecfo
("CFOs' legal liability for errors has skyrocketed.... more are coming to believe that the
financial rewards just aren't as attractive in the face of this elevated risk ... As CFOs get
older, their wariness may grow sharper. 'Increased exposure has been very dramatic, and
CFOs may be thinking that the longer they stay, the greater the potential that there will be
some kind of issue."').
90 The enforcement provision governing Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 3(b)(1), states: "A
violation by any person of this Act ... shall be treated for all purposes in the same
manner as a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.),"
which was already the legislative regime in place. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 3(b)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 7202 (2006).
91 Kelsh, supra note 38, at 1010 ("If, however, section 304 is interpreted so that
liability is imposed only if the Covered Officer has engaged in violations of the securities
laws, then the provision will turn out to be far less significant as ... it will merely clarify
the contours of the [already existing] disgorgement remedy .... (punctuation omitted)).
92 A common justification for adopting the misconduct definition that has a
threshold at negligent conduct, or less, is due to the statutory interpretation canon known
as the Rule Against Surplusage, which proposes that new statutory text is put in place to
effectuate a change. Cf Bloomenthal, supra note 46, at 4. Following this reasoning, the
statutory language should be given independent effect and not be given a "reading [that]
would render the regulation entirely superfluous. . or] mere surplusage," since the Court
has "cautioned against reading a text in a way that makes part of it redundant." Nat'l
Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2535-36 (2007)
(referencing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
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Additionally, the scandals in the late 1990s have made it clear that the
previous securities regulations were not effective in preventing the fraud.93
This is supported by the fact that Sarbanes-Oxley also contains Section 906,
which imposes a penalty for knowingly certifying a report that is false94 and
Section 807, which punishes intentional fraud.95 To give the term
"misconduct" any effect, the language must be a development from the pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley enforcement provisions. Therefore, the intermediate
standard of liability for inattentiveness seems most likely to approach the
textual and congressional understandings of the statute. As such, it is only
apprehension of incurring unintended consequences that appears to be
deterring the SEC from aggressive enforcement.
2. Failure to Differentiate Between the Duties of the Certifiers
The "inattentive" interpretation must be differentiated further. Not only
does the text not say whose or how much misconducts triggers the forfeiture,
but it also fails to differentiate between the CEO and the CFO.96 Typically,
reports and filings are not solely prepared by either the CEO or the CFO, and
portions of the report would seem to be mostly the responsibility of one
executive or another.97 The language seems to suggest that even if the error
that caused the non-compliance is contained in a portion of the report that
typically only the CEO would prepare, both the CEO and CFO would have to
forfeit their bonuses. 98 However, since both the CEO and the CFO must
certify the reports under 302,99 they both become subject to the disgorgement
if there is any misconduct that is not caught and results in a restatement. This
interpretation is consistent with the congressional desire to create an
incentive to affirmatively seek out misconduct. Presumably, Congress
wanted to add the additional requirement that executives had to check each
93 See Westbrook, supra note 83, at 446 ("whether that be the Crash of '29 or Enron,
neither of which were prevented by existing law.... Crisis thus reveals the inadequacy
of existing law").
94 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006).
95 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006).
96 See WILD, supra note 60, at § 1:152.
97 While it is likely the CEO would be held responsible for all aspects of the report,
both financial and non-financial, it seems counterintuitive to have the CFO required to
oversee all company operations in order to avoid potential liability.
98 Looking at Section 302, which required the "principal executive officer. . . and
the principal financial officer" to certify the reports, and the language of Section 304,
which uses the conjunction "and," the plain language seems to suggest that the
disgorgement applies to both CEO and CFO at the same time. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 §§ 302, 304, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7243 (2006).
99 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006).
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other's work to ensure accuracy, but at the same time this seems to create
redundancy of tasks. If the CEO cannot trust that the CFO has discovered the
financial fraud that he is responsible for, he will have to redo a significant
portion of the investigation that was already conducted by the CFO. Such
massive inefficiency would not likely be in the best interest of the company
and would again raise the incentive problem of whether the executives were
acting in the best interest of the company or themselves. 100
However, it is an understood necessity in corporations to rely on the
internal controls and audit systems to catch corporate misconduct, and this
system of redundant accuracy checks was mandated by Congress. 10 1 Given
that Congress favored a policy of redundancy, one should not then use this
redundancy as a justification for reading the plain conjunctive article "and"
to mean "or."102 Congress viewed both executives as directly responsible for
the accuracy of every piece of information disclosed to the public, and thus
enforcement actions under Section 304 should be simultaneously brought
against the CEO and CFO.
3. Failure to Specify the Amount of Profits that
Would Need to be Disgorged
One commentator has posited that "the provision does not specify
whether the disgorged profits on options, or from stock incentive, deferred
compensation or similar plans, whose total value may reflect years of
appreciation, are measured by reference to the appreciation in the year of
payment or over all of the years preceding the date of payment."' 1 3 Here the
language seems to be creating a remedy similar to that in insider trading. If
the goal is to prevent executives from making profit when the public has
been misinformed, (i.e. received less information than the executive), it
seems that any sale of a security during the twelve-month period is fairly
straight forward, as is any new bonus or option or compensation that is given
100 BUTLER AND RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 56-57.
101 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). See also
Aulana Peters, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress' Response to Corporate Scandals:
Will the New Rules Guarantee 'Good' Governance and Avoid Future Scandals?, 28
NOVA L. REv. 283, 286 (2004) ("SEC rules are designed to facilitate the flow of
information from management, auditors, and other advisors, to shareholders and boards
of directors, to... provide an opportunity for and encourage directors to probe and test
management's decisions.").
102 United States v. Fisk, 70 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1865) (refusing to read "and" as
meaning "or" because to construe otherwise would have made the language act as an
"amendment thereof in direct contradiction of its language" and against "the clear
intention of the legislature").
103 WILD, supra note 60, at § 1:152.
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or created within that period. The value of disgorgement must be equal to the
price at the time of the triggering event. 104 To attempt to distinguish the
potential value of appreciation for a twelve-month period absent a triggering
event would be inconsistent with the means of calculating the value of assets
in the current tax and security systems. 0 5
4. Failure to Designate a Specific Means of Enforcement-
Is There a Private Right ofAction?
While Congress gave the SEC specific exemption authority, the language
does not explicitly state that only the SEC can bring these causes of action.
However, this problem has mostly been resolved in the circuit courts, which
have determined that there is no private right of action under Section 304,
and that only the SEC has a right to bring this cause of action.10 6
104 All the values under this approach are readily able to be calculated: the price of
the security when sold and the amount of the bonus are easily identifiable. For the rest the
company will just treat any options or incentives granted within that time period as if
they never existed or were not issued. If sold it is the price of the sale. See 1-5 Tax
Planning for Corporations and Shareholders (MB) § 5.01 (2007).
105 See 1-5 Tax Planning for Corporations and Shareholders (MB) § 5.03 (2007)
("The ideal tax treatment is usually to refrain from treating the grant of the option as itself
being a taxable event.... the exercise of the option should simply be considered a
purchase at a prior negotiated price, with no present tax consequences on that account.
The cost of the stock will be the purchaser's tax basis for the stock, and if and when he
later sells the stock, he will recognize gain or loss at that time.").
106 See In re BISYS Group Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005). See also In re
Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2008); Pedroli v. Bartek,
564 F. Supp. 2d 683, 686 (E.D. Tex. 2008); In re Diebold Derivative Litig., Nos. 5:06-
233, 5:06-418, 2008 WL 564824, at *2 (N.D.Ohio 2008); In re iBasis, Inc. Derivative
Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 214, 223-25 (D.Mass. 2007); In re Infosonics Corp. Derivative
Litig., No. 06-1336, 2007 WL 2572276, at *8-9 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (Slip Copy); In re
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Derivative Litig., No. 5:03-2180, 2007 WL 43557, at *7
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (Slip Copy); In re Intelligroup Sec. Ligit., 468 F. Supp. 2d 670 (D.N.J.
2006); Andropolis v. Snyder, No. 65-01563, 2006 WL 2226189, at *5 (slip copy) Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,930 (D. Colo. 2006); Kogan v. Robinson, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1075,
1082 (S.D. Cal. 2006); In re Whitehall Jewellers, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., No.
05-1050, 2006 WL 468012, at *7 (N.D. I11. 2006); Mehlenbacher v. Jitaru, No. 6:04-
1118, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42007, at *31 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Wuliger v. Sewell, 363 F.
Supp. 2d 940, 950-51 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
Some have expressed doubt, but did not consider the issue. In re Cree, Inc. Sec.
Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93, 327, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21975, at 49-51 (M.D.
N.C. 2005). Others have brought this claim but the court dismissed without reaching the
issue. See In re CNET Networks, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 483 F. Supp. 2d 947
(N.D. Cal. 2007); In re First Bancorp Derivative Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D.
Puerto Rico 2006); Weisler v. Barrows, 2006 WL 3201882, at *1 (D. Del. 2006); In re
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Initially, the courts approached this problem by applying the four-part
Cort test for determining if an implicit, private right of action exists. 107 The
focus of this approach was then narrowed by holding that the legislative
history dispositively concluded that there was no congressional intent to
create a private right of action.10 8 To determine the legislative intent, the
courts looked first to the legislative history and found that it "suggests
strongly that Congress intended that Section 304 be enforced only by the
Securities and Exchange Commission."' 0 9
Additionally, the courts went further, adopting a holistic view of the
statutory interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley, and used this to support their
finding of congressional intent. 110 The courts feel that a "Congressional
intent to grant such a remedy is not evident in the text and structure of the
statute, particularly where Congress has explicitly created a private remedy
in a neighboring provision but did not do so in Section 304 .... this Court
declines to imply a private right of action." 111 In adopting the principle of
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"1 2 the courts may be attempting to
limit the amount of shareholder litigation that can be brought, which many
scholars already feel is excessive. 113 The issue has been heard by courts in
Ferro Corp. Derivative Litig. 2006 WL 2038659, at *8 (N.D. Ohio 2006); In re
Friedman's, Inc. Derivative Litig., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1368 n.20 (N.D. Ga. 2005); In
re Interpublic Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 2397190, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
107 The Whitehall Jewellers court applied the Cort Test:
Under the familiar four-part test set out in Cort v. Ash, an implicit private cause
of action is more likely to be found when: (1) a plaintiff is part of the class for
whose benefit Congress enacted the statute; (2) there is an indication of the
existence of a private right based on the common tools of statutory interpretation
including an examination of legislative history and the structure of the statute; (3) a
remedy would be consistent with the legislative scheme; and (4) the cause of action
is not one traditionally relegated to state law.
In re Whitehall Jewellers, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 2006 WL 468012, at
*7 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing 422 U.S. 66, 78).
108 See id. at *8.
109 In re BISYS Group Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
110 Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 655 ("Because Congress explicitly created a
private right of action in Section 306 and did not do so in Section 304, the natural
inference is that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action in Section
304.").
111 Kogan v. Robinson, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1082. See also In re Whitehall Jewellers,
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 2006 WL 468012, at *8; Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp.
2d at 657.
112 Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 655 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
113 Tim Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and the
Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 369 (1994) ("[Ilt appears that a
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seven of the twelve federal circuits. As no circuit court has held that a private
right of action exists, 114 it seems to suggest that the remaining circuits, when
addressing this matter of first impression, will find the "well reasoned
opinion[s]" of their fellow circuit courts 1 5 persuasive and will likely adopt a
similar position. 116
B. SEC's Enforcement of Section 304: The Neglected Power Tool
It seems clear from the current judicial treatment that no private right of
action exists under Section 304117 and the courts are reluctant to conclude
otherwise without a clear congressional intent or agency interpretation. 118
relatively high number of these shareholder class actions and derivative suits may be
without merit and that the real driving force behind these suits are... attorneys for whom
powerful incentives seem to exist to bring nonmeritorious actions ... [resulting in] low
recovery for plaintiffs [but] a high award of attorneys' fees.").
114 See supra note 106.
115 See Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
116 It should be noted that there is one case, Om Group, Inc. v. Mooney, which did
not reach the merits of the claim, that seems to present a potential problem, but one that
does not directly conflict with the issue of a private right of action. See Om Group, Inc. v.
Mooney, No. 2:05-546, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1446 (Jan. 11, 2006). In this case the
Florida District Court, in stating "the ability to bring a disgorgement action under the
Sarbanes Oxley Act is a dispute 'arising with respect to' the Employment Agreement,
which makes it arbitrable under the Agreement" seems to be suggesting that the
Arbitrator has the power to hear such a claim and decide if the claim can be brought. Id.
at 21. The court did not rule on whether a private right of action would exist if brought in
Federal Court, but it also did not prohibit the arbitrator from awarding repayment under
this Section. The dicta effectively creates the possibility that an arbitrator could order a
statutory remedy while a court would have no right to do so. Id. Since not all the federal
circuits have ruled on the private right of action issue, and the issue is not clearly
codified, appealing an arbitrator's award on the basis of "manifest disregard of the law"
would be potentially problematic. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest
Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 235-36 (2007). This author would recommend adding a
limitation of remedies clause to any arbitration provision which states that the arbitrator
may not order forfeiture of incentive pay or bonuses under 15 U.S.C. § 7243 nor may the
arbitrator order any remedy which is only available for enforcement by the SEC or
another administrative agency.
117 Stanley Keller, Stock Option Pricing Practices Occupy Center Stage, American
Law Institute Course of Study June 28-29, 2007, at 367 ("judicial decisions to date have
held that only the SEC can enforce the compensation forfeiture provision of Section 304
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act"). See also infra Part III.A.4.
118 Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 653, 655 (stating that a court can imply a
private right of action "only where it can confidently conclude Congress so intended" and
to do so in this case would have required it to rewrite the statute) (citing Dept. of Envtl.
Protection Agency v. Long Island Power Auth., 30 F.3d 403, 421 (3d. Cir. 1994)
(quotation and emphasis omitted)).
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The judicial reasoning has firmly placed Section 304 enforcement in the
hands of the SEC, and the SEC alone.1 9 Yet, to date, there have been only
five suits where the SEC has even raised Section 304 forfeiture in its
complaint.' 20 If only the SEC can bring a cause of action for disgorgement
under Section 304, there seems to be a total lack of litigation in this area. 121
It is curious to see the SEC so reluctant to enforce Section 304, while so
eagerly enforcing other Sarbanes-Oxley provisions.122 Section 304 could be a
very powerful tool by creating a greater incentive for executives to ensure the
transparency of disclosures, and creating an affirmative duty of executive
responsibility.' 23 However, the statute can only have this effect if it is
enforced. "If corporate actors know that unethical conduct will have
significant legal ... ramifications, then they will be less inclined to engage in
such conduct" and will actively seek to prevent it.1 24
Looking at the record in the time period between July 1, 2002 and June
30, 2006, over 1,121 publicly traded companies filed a total of 1,786
restatements 125 "made because of financial reporting fraud and/or accounting
errors." 126 This data represents the number of restatements filed since
Sarbanes-Oxley went into effect, 127 and "industry observers" list the
regulations of Sarbanes-Oxley as one of the prime factors that lead to the
"nearly five-fold increase" in the number of restatements. 128 Based on the
analysis of the GAO, it is presumed that any restatement filed that is not due
to a change in accounting policy or a stock split, is due to material non-
119 See Welsh, supra note 81, at 2.
12 0 See infra note 133.
121 See J. Mark Poerio & Crescent A. Moran, They Can't Take It with Them:
'Clawback' Policies Hit Errant Executives where it Hurts Most, 29 NAT'L L. J. (Col. 4)
No. 27, at 2 (2007) ("The SEC has yet to pursue an action to enforce the provision of
304").
122 Cf Kenneth B. Winer, Financial Fraud and Accounting, 1-4 Sec. Enforcement:
Counseling and Defense (MB) § 4.02 (showing an increase number of enforcement
actions each year).
12 3 See infra Part l.B. See also infra note 216.
124 Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 80, at 17.
125 See Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Comm. On Banking, Housing, &
Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Financial Restatements: Update of Public Company Trends,
Market Impacts, and Regulatory Enforcement Activities, GAO-06-678, at 4 (July 24,
2006 and E-Supplement) [hereinafter Report, Financial Restatements, GAO-06-678].
126 United States Government Accountability Office, E-Supplement to Financial
Restatements: Update of Public Company Trends, Market Impacts, and Regulatory
Enforcement Activities, GA0-06-678 (Issued March 5, 2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gao-06-1079sp/index.html.
127 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (effective July
30, 2002).
128 Report, Financial Restatements, GAO-06-678, supra note 125, at 11-12.
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compliance with the securities filing requirements. 129 The restatements
gathered by the GAO were "identified as having been made because of
financial reporting fraud and/or accounting errors," 130 and are for the
purposes of this discussion presumed to be the result of misconduct.131 This
inference is corroborated by the growth in the number of SEC enforcement
actions "involving financial fraud."' 132 Therefore, the SEC has had over a
thousand opportunities where Section 304 enforcement would have been
appropriate.
However, as of December 2007, the SEC had brought Section 304
actions in only five cases.133 More disturbing is that the SEC itself noted in a
press release on May 31, 2007, that this was its "first time" using Section
304.134 The counterpart statistic to this discrepancy between restatements that
would trigger Section 304, and actions where 304 charges were brought, is
129 Report, Financial Restatements, GAO-06-678, supra note 125, at 17, fig.4, n.1
("Our database includes announced restatements that were being made to correct material
misstatements of previously reported financial information. Therefore, our database
excludes announcements involving stock splits, changes in accounting principles, and
other restatements that were not made to correct mistakes in the application of accounting
standards.").
130 The E-Supplement Abstract for the GAO Report (Report, Financial
Restatements, GAO-06-678, http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gao-06-1079sp/ index.
html).
131 Supra Part III.A. 1.
132 Report, Financial Restatements, GAO-06-678, supra note 125, at 6. "The
number of SEC enforcement cases involving financial fraud and issuer reporting issues
increased.., more than ... 130 percent" since 1998 and in 2005 "constituted the largest
category of enforcement actions." Id.
133 SEC v. McGuire, Litig. Rel. No. 2754, 2007 WL 4270709 (Dec. 6, 2007); SEC
v. Brooks, Litig. Rel. No. 20345, 2007 WL 3119762 (Oct. 25, 2007); SEC v. Schroeder,
Litig. Rel. No. 20207, 2007 WL 2126402 (July 25, 2007); SEC v. Shanahan, Litig. Rel.
No. 20193, 2007 WL 2011039 (July 12, 2007); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, Litig.
Rel. No. 20136, 2007 WL 1574067 (May 31, 2007). Since December 2007 there have
been at least two more complaints filed by the SEC seeking Section 304 forfeiture. See
Complaint (No. 20710) at p. 28, SEC v. Sabhlok, Civ. Action No. 08-cv-4238 (N.D. Ca.
2008) (filed Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/
2008/comp2O7lO-sabhlok_pattison.pdf; Complaint (No. 20638) at p. 30, SEC v.
Sycamore Networks, Inc., Civ. Action No. 08-cv- 11166 DPW (D. Ma. 2008) (filed July
9, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20638.pdf.
134 Press Release, SEC, SEC Settles with Mercury Interactive and Sues Former
Mercury Officers for Stock Option Backdating and Other Fraudulent Conduct, SEC Press
Rel. 2007-108 (May 31, 2007) ("The Commission's first ever use of Section 304 of
Sarbanes-Oxley-which allows the commission to seek the repayment of bonuses and
stock sale profits received by CEOs and CFOs where financial results are later restated-
reflects the Commission's willingness to use all available remedies to deprive such senior
officers of illicit gains.").
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the number of times the SEC has exercised its Section 304(b) exemption
authority or otherwise stated that companies with restatements due to
misconduct were exempt from action under Section 304. But again, the SEC
seems to be ignoring Section 304. As of the end of 2007, only three no-action
letters even mention Section 304,135 and not one exemptive order mentions
it. 136 All of those that do mention Section 304, do so only in reference to
internal clawback provisions that the board of directors or shareholders
wished to implement, and the extent it would conflict or overlap with Section
304.137 There is a significant disparity between the number of non-exempt
restatements filed that could have triggered a Section 304 action, and the
number of actions where Section 304 forfeiture was actually sought. 1
38
The lack of enforcement is worrisome and problematic. Under the
current version of the law, and the current judicial interpretations, there is
nothing a private party can do to force the SEC to bring these types of
actions. Consequently, the public should be able to rely on the SEC to bring
these types of actions, or at least do a rudimentary investigation and issue a
no-action letter or exempt the CEO and CFO from potential charges. To fail
to sufficiently pursue actions under Section 304 will encourage investors to
be distrustful of the SEC and large corporations, by reinforcing the public
perception that someone in the company can violate the securities laws. Such
violations result in a huge loss to investors when the company is forced to
restate, and yet the person trusted by the public to prevent such
misconduct, 139 i.e. the CEO or CFO, will still leave at the end of the day with
135 Home Depot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 318, at *
19 (Mar. 7, 2007); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 251, at *4, 17-18, 22, 25, 29-30 (Feb. 17, 2005); Interpretive Guidance on
Restatements for Errors in Accounting for Stock Option Grants, SEC No-Action Letter,
2007 WL 287319, at *4 (Jan. 16, 2007). Cf Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 27 (Jan. 3, 2008) (does not specifically mention a 304 cause of
action but discusses recoupment of executive compensation when earnings were based on
inaccurate financial data).
136 See SEC, Exemptive Orders Archive, (2003-2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders.shtml.
137 For an example of such a discussion see the Home Depot, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2007 WL 754967 (Mar. 7, 2007). No exemptive orders mention Section 304 at all.
138 Granted, the SEC has the sole authority to decide to bring an action, but their use
of enforcement provisions as motivation to act preventatively seem to be significantly
under-represented in the total number of enforcement actions. For a further discussion of
why the SEC might be avoiding enforcement see infra Part IV.
139 See 148 CONG. REc. H5462, H5463 (July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Baker
discussing Conf. Rep. on H.R. 3763) ("A corporate executive takes capital from
individual investors, hard-working investors saving for their first home, their child's
education or their retirement, and has a fiduciary responsibility to manage that money for
their mutual good.").
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his cushy perks totally untouched. 140 Lazy enforcement undermines the
incentives of the Section, and decreases the faith of the general public in the
efforts of companies and the SEC to ensure financial reporting accuracy. 141
Five years of unanswered, misconduct-triggered restatements cannot be
remedied by five actions and the absence of definitive agency guidance.
C. Five Cases in Year Five: What They Tell Us
While five counts in five cases 142 can hardly be referred to as a trend,
both the sudden willingness to bring these causes of action and the
similarities between these cases are potentially suggestive of the tone of
future enforcement. When one looks at the actual complaints filed in these
five cases, one can begin to see an implicit understanding of the claim and its
elements. Unfortunately, if one limits the scope of enforcement actions to
only scenarios similar to these cases, the potential power and effect of
Section 304 becomes severely stunted.
The complaints, to the extent that they are indicative of a common
understanding of the action, do add clarity to several disputed issues. Most
important is the presence of an SEC complaint in the first place, ruling out
the possibility that the SEC believed this to be only a private right of action.
Additionally, the prayer for relief in each case designates separate counts for
"disgorgement of ill-gotten gains" and "repayment of bonuses and
compensation," demonstrating that the SEC believes these to be different
types of relief. Presumably, this is to differentiate the purpose behind Section
304 from those established understandings of the purposes for
disgorgement. 143 Two of the five complaints include paragraphs of specific
alleged facts that appear to be directed at the elements of the Section 304
140 See Carrie Johnson & Ben White, Opportunity for Corporate Fraud has
Shrunk-but It's Still There, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2006, at D1 ("Executives collected
more than $400 million in salary and bonuses but denied knowing about fraud on their
watch.").
141 Stephen Taub, Restatements Surged in 2005, Says Study: The Total Number of
2005 Restatements Works Out to One Restatement for Every 12 Public Companies, CFO
MAGAZINE, Mar. 3, 2006, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5591688 ("'When
so many companies produce inaccurate financial statements, it seriously calls into
question the quality of information that investors relied upon to make capital-allocation
decisions,' noted the report. 'Investors need unbiased, competently prepared financial
statements to make these decisions efficiently."').
14 2 See supra note 133.
143 Complaint (No. 20193) at p. 23, SEC v. Shanahan, Civ. Action No. 4:07-cv-1262
(E.D. Mo. 2007) (filed July 12, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/2007/comp20193.pdf (compare Count III with Count VI). See also
discussion of disgorgement, supra Part II.B.
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violation specifically. 144 In three of these cases the SEC seems to suggest
that a restatement is required when financial statements "by virtue of...
misconduct, failed to [be] . . in conformity with GAAP."' 145 The language
also evidences a clear policy understanding that where bonuses and gains are
derivative of the financial performance of the company, and that performance
was artificially inflated, the defendant should not get to keep those gains. 146
There is some evidence that these claims are typically brought in cases
where the CEO or CFO has participated in some action that is particularly
shocking to the principles of Sarbanes-Oxley 147 and, in these five cases,
knowingly or deliberately. 148 Additionally, in each case the CEO has been
the alleged driving force behind the misconduct perpetrated against the
issuer, and the defendant actively disregarded warnings and sanctions
concerning their illicit conduct. 149 It is clear that Section 304 is intended at a
144 Complaint (No. 20387) at 23, SEC v. McGuire, Civ. Action No. 07-CV-4779-
JMR/FLN (D. Minn. 2007) (filed Dec. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20387.pdf; Complaint (No. 20193)
at 50, SEC v. Shanahan, supra note 143.
145 Complaint (No. 20136) at 116, SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC (fUk/a
Mercury Interactive Corporation), Anmon Landan, Sharlene Abrams, Douglas Smith, and
Susan Skaer, No. 07-2822 (RS) (N.D. Cal. 2007) (filed May 31, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20136.pdf. See also id. at T$ 7-8 &
81; Complaint (No. 20387) at 23, SEC v. McGuire, supra note 144; Complaint (No.
20193) at 50, SEC v. Shanahan, supra note 143. But, see, Coffee, Jr., supra note 61, at
343 ("This concept of 'fair presentation' is not limited by any reference to GAAP, and
compliance with GAAP is clearly not dispositive of whether the issuer has provided a
'fair presentation.' Instead, the standard seems to intend that the issuer provide full and
fair disclosure in the form of a holistic picture of the company that reveals all material
financial weaknesses, even if their disclosure were not required by GAAP.").
146 Complaint (No. 20136) at 81, SEC v. Mercury Interactive, supra note 145
("profits through the sale of the shares they acquired through their exercises of Mercury
options, which were sold into the market at times when the price of Mercury's stock was
inflated by the fraud... [and] bonuses [while] largely discretionary, their award was at
least in part related to the financial performance of the company during the period of the
fraud, which resulted in material GAAP expenses being omitted from the company's
financial reports.").
147 The actions in the cases are deliberate attempts at deception, directly counter to
transparency and disclosure. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745, 745-747 (aiming to "protect investors by improving the accuracy and
reliability of corporate disclosures").
14 8 The named party in each complaint is also being charged with 17(a) actions and
10(b) and 13(b)(2) aiding and abetting actions, requiring a "knowing" or "reckless"
violation. See supra notes 144-146; see infra note 150.
149 See Complaint (No. 20345) at 29, SEC v. Brooks, Civ. Action No. 07-61526-
CIV-Altonaga/Tumoff (S.D. Fla. 2007) (filed Oct. 25, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20345.pdf (alleging that Brooks
"largely ignored the auditors' concerns"); Complaint (No. 20207) at 1 1, SEC v.
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minimum to prevent CEO's from benefiting from their own misconduct' 50
and to act as the catchall penalty for the compensation and funds that the
other actions did not reach. However, the complaints that do specifically
address misconduct leave the question of the causal link open.' 51 It is
conceivable that the use of Section 304 is no more relevant than any other
penalty on the SEC's laundry list, and was tacked onto the complaint in order
to throw the proverbial book at the defendant. If any enforcement trend is to
be gleaned from these five cases, it should be viewed as a floor, not as a
ceiling. In other words, just because the SEC knows it has enough evidence
to make out the Section 304 cause of action in these situations, does not
mean that a less clear causal connection to the misconduct, such as
recklessness or negligence, could not also impose liability on the CEO and
CFO.
In looking at the history and the case law surrounding Section 304, it
seems clear that its intent was to impose a penalty for failing to search out all
forms of corporate misconduct. 152 This appears to provide the correct
incentives for executives to ensure the corporate health of the organizations,
and logically seems tied to their compensation for carrying out this task. 153
Additionally, the fact that all the courts that have considered the issue have
found that no private right of action exists suggests that the SEC was selected
as the enforcement agency to impose upon the statute some level of restraint,
Schroeder, No. C07 3798 JW (N.D. Cal. 2007) (filed July 25, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20207-schroeder.pdf ("Schroeder
continued to engage in this practice even after being specifically instructed by Company
counsel that retroactively selecting grant dates without adequate disclosure was
improper.").
150 Complaint (No. 20193) at 7, SEC v. Shanahan, supra note 143 ("Shanahan
personally received ill-gotten gains, including $8,916,562 in backdated profits, from his
participation in this scheme."). It seems that the SEC is at least willing to take enough
action "to prevent CEOs or CFOs from making large profits by selling company stock, or
receiving company bonuses, while ... misleading the public and regulators about the
poor health of the company." S. REP. No. 107-205, at 26 (2002).
151 See Complaint (No. 20193) at 50, SEC v. Shanahan, supra note 143 ("The
requirement to restate resulted from Shanahan's and others' misconduct in connection
with the granting of stock options.").
152 Nelson, supra note 59, at 1167 (Stating that Sarbanes-Oxley helped to pierce the
veil "in order to impose liability on directors, officers, and employees for breaching their
fiduciary duty... [and] prior fundamental obligations to guarantee accurate financial
reporting.").
153 Some have commented that ensuring financial accuracy is becoming an
increased part of the CFO's general job description. See Don Durfee, Pay Up: With
Finance Talent in High Demand, Companies are Boosting Compensation-And Making
Some Demands of Their Own, CFO MAGAZINE, Nov. 1, 2006 ("compensation for a
growing number of CFOs is evolving: they're making more, but boards are also making
them work harder to achieve the mega pay levels that became common in the 1990s").
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presuming that the SEC would balance the benefit and necessity of bringing
actions under Section 304 against the potential risks and financial burdens. 154
To see the enforcement of such a strong provision barely used seems to
indicate either a systemic problem or a conscious policy determination by the
SEC for not bringing these causes of action.
IV. POSSIBLE REASONS WHY THE SEC IS NOT PURSUING ACTIONS
UNDER SECTION 304
Part IV discusses several theories as to why the SEC is not bringing
enforcement actions under Section 304. The first theory as to why the SEC is
not bringing these actions is that the incentives of the statute have properly
functioned to put a stop to all corporate misconduct or the CEO and CFO
have successfully found all the misconduct. Another apparent reason is that
due to the ambiguity and confusion surrounding the provision the SEC does
not know what situations are appropriate, or feels that many situations are
inappropriate for bringing such actions, so it often chose not to pursue this
particular cause of action.155 Another systemic reason why the SEC is failing
to bring these actions may be because the provision is either obsolete or
ineffective. With so many remedies available for use on violators of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 304 may not have the deterrent
effect it was designed to have. 156 Clearly, if the same violation could allow
for treble damages or criminal sanctions, the loss of compensation would be
superseded by this. Alternatively, so many similar damages may be available
in private causes of action and derivative suits that the targeted funds under
304 may already have been disgorged and returned to the issuer. Therefore,
bringing an action under 304 would be futile.
154 Cf Report, Financial Restatements, GAO-06-678, supra note 125, at 45 ("SEC's
view of the appropriateness of the penalty against corporations versus the individuals
who actually commit the violations is to be based on two considerations[: ... whether the
corporation received a direct benefit as a result of the violations ... [and] the degree to
which the penalty will recompensate or further harm injured shareholders.").
155 The list of factors given for assessing actions that impose civil penalties focus on
"the extent of the injury to innocent parties" and "the level of intent on the part of
perpetrators." This consideration of injury and intent seems to be in direct conflict with
the current understanding of "misconduct" as requiring negligent liability as opposed to
direct or intentional liability. Report, Financial Restatements, GAO-06-678, supra note
125, at 45. This goes against the previously proposed "inattentiveness" interpretation. See
supra Part III.A. 1.
156 Dawes & Johnson, supra note 30, at 120 ("Recent disgorgement cases brought
by SEC suggest that individuals who actively engage in misconduct are the typical targets
of SEC's prosecutorial might.").
[Vol. 70:195
SARBANES-OXLEY
There are also several policy justifications as to why the SEC might
actively be choosing to not bring causes of action under Section 304. It might
feel that the market is self-regulating to correct this problem through
contractual "clawback" provisions or reputation value, and that no additional
government regulation is needed to root out misconduct. 157 The SEC might
have an economic disincentive to pursue these causes of action, finding it
excessive and that the imposition of these causes of action will do significant
harm to the companies and the market as a whole. 158 Finally, the most likely
explanation for the SEC's lack of action is that the SEC is signaling an
increase in enforcement of Section 304 in the upcoming years. 159 The SEC is
likely conscious of the high costs of complying with many of the procedures
required by Sarbanes-Oxley and has actively chosen to give the market a few
years to set up these procedures and find the past misconduct before
imposing a harsh punishment. 160 This theory best explains the sudden action
in 2007, when no enforcement was previously seen. 16 1 The SEC is signaling
to the market that companies have had their chance to adjust to Sarbanes-
Oxley; if they have not found the misconduct by now, the SEC is going to
nail them for it. This Part will analyze the likelihood of each of these possible
reasons in turn.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Was a Total Success and There Is No More
Corporate Misconduct
The first potential explanation for the lack of enforcement actions
brought under Section 304 could be that there is in fact no need to bring these
actions. Such a situation would arise in the event that no restatements are
filed "due to misconduct" and nothing has triggered the need for
enforcement. 162 This reason is addressed first because it is the theory that is
157 See Poerio & Moran, supra note 121 ("institutional investors are pressing
mightily for restatement clawbacks").
158 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 54 (discussing the rate at which
companies are going dark, or going private).
159 See infra Part IV.F. This concept originated in a discussion with Paul Rose,
Assistant Professor of Law at Moritz College of Law.
160 Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 80, at 18 ("Nearly five years after SOX,
companies are still restating earnings on a regular basis, uncovering earlier
misconduct.").
161 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Settles with Mercury Interactive and
Sues Former Mercury Officers for Stock Option Backdating and Other Fraudulent
Conduct, SEC Press Rel. No. 2007-108 (May 31, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-108.htm.
162 Since the term "misconduct" is so poorly defined it could be that nothing is
falling within the definition of the term. See supra Part III.A. 1.
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most easily dismissed. While most of the legal community believes that
Sarbanes-Oxley has the potential to end corporate misconduct, or is a major
step towards effective fraud prevention and securities law enforcement, few
believe that corporate misconduct has in fact ceased.163 The sheer number of
restatements filed since Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment in 2002 is strong
evidence that corporate misconduct is being uncovered every day. 164 While
this is positive evidence that more misconduct is being identified by the new
auditing procedures, it is also clear that those same provisions have not yet
reached the level of fraud prevention. 65 However, if one is to follow the
congressional mandate under Section 304, catching the misconduct after the
filing of a financial report is not enough to protect the incentive pay of the
CEO and CFO, whose job it was to catch the misconduct before the filing of
the financial report, in order that the public would not have been misled as to
the state of the company for even a day.166 Given the expansion of the SEC
enforcement efforts over the past few years 167 it is doubtful that even the
SEC would argue that Sarbanes-Oxley has managed to catch all past and
present corporate misconduct.
B. SEC is Unsure of Its Authority Under Section 304
The second reason the SEC might be hesitant in enforcing Section 304 is
that it is unclear of its authority or is afraid to act beyond the scope of the
provision. 168 While it has been established that there is significant ambiguity
in the statutory text as drafted, 169 it is clearly within the legislative authority
163 See Johnson & White, supra note 140, at D1; John W. Schoen, Corporate Fraud
Alive and Well in the U.S.: Despite Enron Verdict, Accounting Reforms, White-Collar
Crime Thriving, MSNBC (May 25, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12762573/
("U.S. losses from fraud rose to an estimated $638 billion in 2005 - up from $600
billion in 2002.").
164 See Report, Financial Restatements, GAO-06-678, supra note 125, at 6.
165 Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 80, at 18.
166 See Johnson & White, supra note 140, at D1.
167 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 12 (2006) [hereinafter
CURRENT ENFORCEMENT], available at http://www.uschamber.com/ publications/
reports/0603sec.htm (click link to pdf) (concluding that "the SEC's enforcement program
has taken on an increasingly punitive tone" and major expansion effort).
168 Scholars have noted that use of Section 304 might face constitutional challenges
for "arbitrariness" because the amounts required to be repaid were not "causally linked to
the misconduct;" if the incentive pay was calculated on the correctly restated amount they
would still be entitled to some portion of the pay already received. Fraidin et al., supra
note 37, at 61.
169 Supra Part III.A.
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of the SEC to issue interpretive guidance and regulations.' 70 One could
attempt to draw interpretive guidance from their chosen enforcement actions,
and conclude that the SEC is implicitly imposing a personal culpability
requirement, but to do this would give too much precedential value to such a
small number of enforcement actions. 171 When considering precedential
effect, one should consider that the SEC has limited resources so it is not
surprising that it may target its greatest weapons at the most heinous
violations, or may only have the budget to pursue the most egregious
cases.1 72 However, the SEC should be extremely cautious not to accidentally
set a precedent of only enforcing it in such cases, because to do so would
artificially restrict its power and the deterrent effect Congress intended the
provision to have.
While it seems possible that the SEC could have believed at the time of
enactment that there was a private right of action under Section 304, it seems
unlikely that it would persist in that position given the utter lack of
commentary to that effect and the unanimous view of the Federal Courts that
have held to the contrary. 173 Although a perceived lack of clarity or authority
might have been a legitimate justification when the Act was first passed, this
reason seems to lack credible weight as an explanation for not bringing
actions under Section 304, especially in the current enforcement regime. 174
A slightly more likely explanation for the SEC's ambivalent enforcement
is that it is unclear as to the elements of the claim and which factual scenarios
would fall within its statutory authority. The abundance of ambiguity in the
statutory text is clear support for this proposition. 175 In addition to the
argument over the meaning of misconduct, a debate exists over the term
"required,"'176 as well as when a restatement is required to be filed
(suggesting a mandatory action) versus when a restatement is common or
170 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a) (2006) ("The
Commission shall promulgate such rules and regulations, as may be necessary or
appropriate ... in furtherance of this Act.").
171 It would not be prudent to determine precedent based on only five cases. See
supra Part III.C. Cf David Phillips, Sarbanes-Oxley Act-Fraud Deterrence with Teeth?,
SEEKING ALPHA, (May 28, 2006), available at http://seekingalpha.com/article/l 1286-
sarbanes-oxley-act-fraud-deterrence-with-teeth-q-gmst-tyc-cd ("[W]e are still looking to
the SEC to find a 'test case' on which to cut its teeth.").
172 See Bloomenthal, supra note 46, at *11.
173 See supra Part III.A.4.
174 CURRENT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 167, at 18-23.
175 See Coffee Jr., supra note 61, at 337 n.107 ("Ambiguities abound here."). See
also supra Part III.A.
176 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2006) ("If an issuer
is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the
issuer... executive officer.., shall reimburse the issuer[.]").
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filed at the discretion of the issuer. 177 While restatements have been filed
"due to misconduct" within the company, no restatement was actually
"required" to be filed. 178 The SEC has provided little interpretive guidance as
to when a restatement is "required" to be filed, rather than recommended or
necessitated. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 directive on restatements
of 10-K or 10-Q financial reports states that:
If any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the statements...
filed with the Commission, an amendment . . .shall be filed with the
Commission, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors. 179
Given recent SEC attention to compliance with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) requirements, it is likely that "a restatement
is 'required' when the restatement is necessary for an issuer's auditors to
issue their opinion on the financial statements. ' 180 But, it should not be
forgotten that the SEC has the power to clarify its own authority or
understanding through regulations and interpretive guidance. 181 It seems
clear that the SEC has the power to clarify the Section 304 cause of action
and eliminate ambiguity, which begs the question: why then is there not one
regulation addressing the ambiguities in 304?182
177 The SEC can request information or one can voluntarily choose to provide it, so
the use of the phrase "require" could be read to mean only in those instances where the
SEC has actually issued a subpoena or taken some other administrative action. See U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Notice on Supplying Information Voluntarily, SEC
2405 (7-96), http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/sec2405.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
178 Fraidin et al., supra note 37, at 56 (presenting two different interpretations of
"required" and suggesting that it might create a rebuttable presumption, where the
company would have to prove that the restatement was in fact "discretionary"). See also
Alston & Bird LLP Securities Law Advisory, Sarbanes-Oxley Requires Disgorgement of
Bonuses and Profits in the Event of a Financial Reporting Restatement, (Sept. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/ab090902.pdf (last visited Oct. 3,
2008).
179 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (2002)
(emphasis added). Here the argument would be that any material change makes a
restatement required.
180 Eigenbrodt, supra note 81, at 2. But see Coffee, Jr., supra note 59, at 344 ("[i]n
interpreting this new [certification] requirement, the SEC has cited Simon for the
proposition that '[p]resenting financial information in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles may not necessarily satisfy obligations under the antifraud
provision of the federal securities laws."').
181 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a) (2006).
182 One could argue that the SEC is purposefully vague to allow the law to have the
greatest deterrent effect. However, to enforce the provision without clarifying the extent
and elements of the cause of action, the SEC is risking an unintended precedent, and in
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C. Enforcement Actions Under Section 304 Are a Futile Waste of Time
It is possible that the SEC has chosen not to pursue Section 304
enforcement in the past six years because the potentially recoverable salary
would already have been recovered through actions brought under other
statutory authority. The SEC is already able to disgorge "ill gotten gains"
which would include any profits from fraud, misconduct, or knowledge of
such.183 Punishment for securities violations is significantly aided by private
actions in the form of derivative suits, such as a 10b-5 action,1 84 which could
also target any gains or profits made from stock sales or incentive pay. 185
Additionally, despite possessing an element of scienter, a Rule 1Ob-5 action
would target the causal connection between the CEO and the misleading
statement, and would successfully disgorge much of the same funds as
Section 304.186 Because these actions target the same source for damages
that Section 304 would target, it is possible that those bonuses, incentives,
and options have already been disgorged; with that, the SEC perceives no
utility in strict enforcement under Section 304.187
Alternatively, the SEC could deem that other provisions-such as
Section 906, which imposes criminal sanctions and carries a maximum
sentence of 20 years in jail,188 or Section 807, with a maximum of a 25 year
the interim, is only increasing the market's anxiety by not providing adequate notice of
what constitutes a violation.
183 Winer, supra note 122, at § 18.10 (describing the purpose of disgorgement as
being causally connected to unjust enrichment).
184 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
185 The SEC's enforcement efforts can be greatly aided by the existence of
derivative suits: the SEC does not have the money or staff to vindicate the rights of every
investor. See Shannon Rose Selden, (Self-)Policing the Market: Congress's Flawed
Approach to Securities Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 73 (2006) ("'[P]rivate securities
class actions can complement SEC enforcement actions."') (citations omitted).
186 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5.
187 The SEC stated, "Under the terms of the settlement, McGuire's disgorgement
plus prejudgment interest and his Section 304 reimbursement would be deemed satisfied
by his return to UnitedHealth of approximately $600 million in cash and... options
pursuant to the terms of his separate settlement with the company... announced today,
resolving employment claims and shareholder derivative lawsuits filed against McGuire
in state and federal courts[.]" Former United Health Group CEO/Chairman Settles Stock
Options Backdating Case for $468 Million, SEC v. McGuire, Litig. Rel. No. 2754, 2007
WL 4270709 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
2007/lr20387.htm (last modified Dec. 6, 2007).
188 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). See also WILLIAM
E. KNEEPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §
13.14, 13-106 (7th ed. 2002).
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sentence 189-are far greater deterrents than threatening a director's bonus. 190
However, this particular section places a cap on the monetary recovery at
five million dollars, and the potential penalty might not seem as real as a
forfeiture of personal compensation would seem. Section 304 is an additional
means of shifting the risk of non-compliance onto the CEO. 191 If the SEC
were to enforce this provision as proposed, 192 it would represent a strong
method for countering the current incentives for executives to have a "low
commitment to legal compliance," thereby adding significant incentives for
the SEC to bring additional enforcement actions. 193
D. SEC Believes the Market Will Self-Regulate and Therefore Does
Not Need to Act
The possibility exists that the SEC is refraining from action in order to
give the internal structures of the company time to put in place self-
protections from fraud. 194 There is some evidence in the last six years that
companies are amending bylaws to add incentive compensation "clawback"
policies in order to create a "carefully focused deterrent"'195 to prevent
"'management benefitting from unsound financial statement[s.]' 1 96 The
SEC does not choose to interfere with the implementation of these policies,
unless the proposed policy is challenged by the company as vague. 197 For the
most part, the SEC appears to be looking for companies to explicitly state
how their internal "clawback" policy will interact with the operation of
189 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006). See also KNEEPER
& BAILEY, supra note 188, at § 13.14, 13-112.
190 Schoen, supra note 163 ("Fines and settlements now regularly top $100
million").
191 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 786.
192 See supra Part III.A.
193 Di Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 788-89.
194 GCI Financial, SEC Not Compelled to Enforce "Clawback,"
FiNANZNACHRICHTEN.DE, Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.fmanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-
2006-06/artikel-550256.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) ("A smattering of companies
have... begun voluntarily writing their own in-house clawback policies in the event of
future restatemen... ").
195 Poerio & Moran, supra note 121, at 2.
196 Nelson, supra note 59, at 1181.
197 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 415667, at *4 (Feb.
17, 2005) ("'[I]t is unclear how the proposed policy would relate to the Company's
responsibilities under Section 304[.]").
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Section 304.198 Such a treatment of the regulation is consistent with a view of
the Section as a default provision, allowing companies to potentially expand
on the scope of this provision. Or, it could be merely due to the fact that the
SEC is unsure of the extent of its enforcement capability-so it wants to see
a more explicit policy statement, such as: "following a restatement of the
Company's financial statements, the Company shall recover any
compensation received by the CEO and CFO that is required to be recovered
by Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002."199 Because the SEC usually
enforces policies with an eye towards the harm to the investors and "the
presence or lack of remedial steps by the corporation," 200 it is possible that
the SEC is waiting for the market, and potentially company shareholders, to
voice outrage at the retention of incentive pay in such situations and take
enough action internally to make Section 304 assume the role of a default,201
rather than the only means of targeting the failure to discover internal
misconduct. This is truly the free market ideal that if the stakeholders, whom
the CEO and CFO report to, are bothered by the level to which these parties
are monitoring the company, let them take action to effect such a change
internally.202
E. SEC is Implicitly Exempting Companies Because It Believes
Enforcement Creates the Wrong Outcomes
The SEC has an acute awareness of the delicate balance of the financial
market, and a potential reason it might be avoiding active enforcement is the
198 Id. at *2. By choosing to take No-Action the SEC appears to be agreeing with the
Company's assessment that the proposal lacks clarity on the breadth of the interaction
with Section 304. Id. at *13.
199 Home Depot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 754967, at *8 (Mar. 7,
2007) (SEC found the proposal sound and did not recommend exclusion from proxy
material).
200 Report, Financial Restatements, GAO-06-678, supra note 125, at 45.
201 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Symposium, Litigation Reform Since the
PSLRA: A Ten-Year Retrospective: Panel Three: Sarbanes-Oxley Governance Issues:
Federal Corporate Law: Lessons From History, 106 COLuM. L. REv. 1793, 1809-10
(2006). "Stock exchanges have also moved to require greater scrutiny of executive
compensation arrangements. In 2003, the SEC approved Nasdaq and NYSE listing rules
that require shareholder approval of equity compensation plans." Id. at 1810.
202 Incidentally, this could be a developing area to watch in the future, because it is
very telling about a company's corporate governance and their level of integrity and
transparency, if there is widespread resistance to even the most tame type of "clawback"
policy (i.e. those where if the CEO defrauds the company the issuer is entitled to
repayment of bonuses and incentive pay) which does not approach the level of
"clawback" mandated by Section 304. See Ramirez, supra note 3, at 337-38 (discussing
executive compensation as the 'canary in the coal mine"').
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fear of creating poor incentives through over-regulating which would operate
contrary to its objectives. The goal of the Act is to create transparency,203 but
potential results of such a high penalty for restatement could be incentives to
avoid restatements, to take additional risks or to simply to leave the
market.204 There is also a fear of upsetting the delicate balance between the
different facets of the business community.20 5
Because there is currently little to no information on the extent of
conduct that might trigger liability, the SEC could have a substantial fear of
creating an incentive to deceive the public and to not issue a restatement
when misconduct is discovered. 20 6 Those seeking to avoid the potential
misconduct might engage in a system of excessive surveillance, 207
disproportionately dedicating their time to monitoring tasks and not
development tasks.208 However, there seems to be significant evidence that
the new enforcement regime has little concern for the significantly increased
203 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006). See also Henry M.
Paulson, Jr., The Key Test of Accurate Financial Reporting is Trust, FINANCIAL TIMES,
May 17, 2007, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp407.htm ("Accurate
and transparent financial reporting is vital to the integrity of our capital markets and the
strength of the US economy.").
2 04 Di Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 793-94 ("Overall, the law's vague mandate to the
securities industry... generates denial rather than compliance").
205 See Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: How the
SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml ("[A]ll of the SEC's actions must be taken
with an eye toward promoting the capital formation that is necessary to sustain economic
growth.").
206 Fraidin et al., supra note 37, at 56 (discussing that a "consequence of greater
enforcement of Section 304, is that it may create incentives for CEOs and CFOs not to
restate financial results.").
207 WILD, supra note 60, at § 1:152 ("Officers and directors often question securities
counsel about the penalties for noncompliance.., to justify in their own minds the time,
aggravation, and expense involved in the preparation of these documents.").
208 It seems to render the audit and compliance procedures meaningless if they
cannot blame someone else for their agent's failure to catch the fraud. Many argue the
wisdom of the extensive audit procedures and requirements, but if the directors and
officers know that they have to trust the information and results presented in those
reports, they will have a strong incentive to ensure that the internal control systems are
100% accurate, which aligns their goals with those of potential shareholders for complete
information.
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cost of compliance and extensive redundancy of tasks, 209 despite the outrage
of the business community.210
The alternative for those more honest and risk averse officers is to either
leave the company or move to a company where they would not be subjected
to such a high risk of forfeiture.211 In addition to the potential loss of
executive talent, heavy enforcement could have the counter-productive side
effects of companies "going dark," or no longer maintaining their status as
publicly traded companies to avoid the burdens of being Sarbanes-Oxley
compliant.212 The result in either circumstance would be to remove the most
qualified executives from filling those positions where they would be most
likely to protect public investors against misconduct.
The SEC might also fear disruption of the market's own controls for
regulating. Some might argue that it is the role of director and officer
insurance (D & 0 insurance) to offset this risk.213 In this scenario, the
resulting effectiveness of D & 0 insurance would depend entirely on the
willingness of the insurance companies to assume the risk of a
restatement. 214 This is probably less of a concern than under other
provisions, since under Section 304 the price of the risk is easily determined,
209 Carney, supra note 86, at 151 ("These figures understate the real costs of
compliance.... [In most cases they do not mention, much less quantify, the opportunity
cost of executive time.").
210 See Johnson & White, supra note 140, at Dl ("Jeffrey Stone... said some new
rules, especially one that requires a company... to examine financial controls, impose
heavy costs 'that far outstrip the protections that are afforded."').
211 McCann, supra note 90 ("[T]he job of such a CFO is getting bigger and harder at
the same time the risk inherent in the position is rising. That results in more departures,
both voluntary and forced... The increased regulatory demands that were triggered by
Sarbanes-Oxley certainly have influenced some of those decisions. 'The workload has
gone up 20 to 25 percent just because of the new regulation'.... ").
212 Camey, supra note 86, at 150 (A study showed "[a]ggregate SEC compliance
costs were $12.2 million, or nearly fifty-one percent of total profits. When costs of
compliance reach this level, it is indeed time for a firm to exit public markets."). Cf
Nelson, supra note 59, at 1176, 1189-93 (companies might make this shift because "the
Act does not apply to private companies"). Some have even suggested that going dark
might increase executive's incentives for misconduct. See Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-
Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 703, 743-
44 (2007) ("When companies go private, there is a stark conflict of interest.... Managers
of these companies frequently use accounting gimmicks to artificially depress reported
performance just before taking the company private in an effort to reduce the purchase
price.").
213 Carolyn Said, Who Pays Mounting Legal Bills? Insurers May Cover Directors,
Execs-For Now, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 20, 2006, at DI ("Major corporations pay hefty
premiums for D&O insurance that indemnifies their top executives... from liability for
alleged wrongful acts committed on their watch.").
214 Dawes & Sorrell, supra note 54, at 6-7.
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suggesting that D & 0 insurance might cover Section 304 violations, but at
an increase over the already high premium. 215 Unfortunately, if such
coverage existed it would greatly reduce the incentive of the CEO to take an
active role in monitoring misconduct,216 and therefore seem to undermine the
public policy of drafting the statute. 217 Alternatively, insurance companies
are likely to impose a policy exclusion of coverage based on fraud or actual
knowledge or involvement. 218 Through private market incentives, an
exclusion would add the personal culpability requirement that some feel is
missing from the statutory text.219
Finally, companies might adjust their payment structure based on a
director or an officer's desires to avoid potential losses, issuing a much
greater portion of CEO and CFO compensation in the form of straight
salary.220 Clearly such a shift would remove the benefits of incentive pay,
which operates to align the interests of officers with the interests of the
shareholders and cause them to have an incentive to promote innovation and
success of the company.221 Unfortunately, this result would also create a
moral hazard by incentivizing those officers to do less work because their
salary is guaranteed, and decreasing the value of the 304 "regret theory"
215 Id. at 6 ("companies... will likely face increased rates and potentially restrictive
terms.").
2 16 Said, supra note 213, at D1 ("Without D&O insurance, people would be
reluctant to be... executives because if something went wrong.., they.., might find
their personal assets on the line.").
2 17 See, e.g., James Denison, Anticipated Coverage Issues Arising from Securities
Actions Seeking Return of 11-Gotten Gains, 33 (No. 2) SEC. REG. L. J. 162 (2005);
Johnson & White, supra note 140, at DI ("Despite new laws and regulations, companies
still face.., a powerful motive for accounting fraud.").
2 18 Dawes & Sorrell, supra note 54, at 6-7 ("D&O insurers are certain to review the
information disclosed to them during the underwriting process with an eye for any
material misstatements or omissions that would provide the insurer the right to rescind
the policy. They are also likely to seek out various policy exclusions to deny coverage.").
219 Kelsh, supra note 38, at 1042 (concluding that the language would still
"accomplish [a] meaningful purpose" if a personal culpability requirement was read in).
220 Nelson, supra note 59, at 1192.
221 1-5 Tax Planning for Corporations and Shareholders (MB) § 5.03 (2008) ("The
nature of stock options makes them an ideal method, in appropriate cases, for
compensating the executive ... a substantial increase in the value of the shares may give
... an extremely valuable asset. The incentive thereby given to the employee to cause the
corporation to prosper and grow can be tremendous."). However, there are some who
theorize that "equity components of managerial compensation have been more severely
decoupled from managers' contributions to company performance than appearances
might suggest." Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Symposium, Pay without
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 652 (2005). See also Johnson &
White, supra note 140, at Dl ("Repeated studies have shown virtually no connection
between high compensation and good corporate performance.").
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incentives.222 While the SEC may fear disrupting the balance of the market
through heavy enforcement, a complete lack of enforcement will not
accomplish its primary concern of "promoting the disclosure of important
market-related information . . . and protecting against fraud, '223 and will
specifically undermine the congressional intent of the Act.224
F. SEC is Progressively Implementing the Enforcement of Section 304
In Order to Allow Companies Time to Adjust
The theories thus far have underestimated the active role the SEC is
taking in Section 304 enforcement, by ignoring the sudden spike in
enforcement in 2007.225 This author believes that the SEC is aware of all the
negative consequences that could result from enforcement of this
provision,226 and has actively chosen to tread lightly. The SEC realizes that
the market needs time to adjust 227 and that the extensive and costly internal
control systems, mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, take time to implement and
become operational before the new misconduct catching systems can actually
catch the misconduct.228 The choice that the SEC made in light of this
knowledge was to allow the companies a chance to develop systems to find
the misconduct, disclose it to the public and take the opportunity to file the
222 Di Lorenzo states that, "[R]egret theory, refers to the finding that individuals
regret adverse consequences stemming from their actions more than adverse
consequences stemming from inaction. Thus, risks from maintaining the status quo (e.g.,
risk of exposure to liability) are minimized while risks of changing the status quo (e.g.,
loss of profits) are exaggerated." Di Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 789. By lessening the risk
of liability, officers will spend less time monitoring and engage in more risky behavior,
which is in direct conflict to the goals of the 304 penalty.
223 Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. "Crucial to the SEC's effectiveness in each
of these areas is its enforcement authority." Id.
224 See Nelson, supra note 59, at 1196 ("[The effectiveness of these provisions is
dependent on the SEC's. . . enforcing compliance with the provisions.").
225 See supra Part III.C.
226 See supra Part IV.E.
227 Report, Financial Restatements, GAO-06-678, supra note 125, at 48 ("Currently,
approximately 60 percent of public companies-generally smaller public companies-
have yet to fully implement the internal control requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
• . , "1).
228 Report, Financial Restatements, GAO-06-678, supra note 125, at 2, notes:
Industry observers expected that the number of public companies restating their
financial statements would increase for some period of time because of increased scrutiny
of internal controls over financial reporting, and then eventually level off as companies
improved their controls.
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restatements, without proverbially "throwing the book at them." 229 This
allowed companies to file their restatements without fear that the reason they
had missed some misconduct was because they did not have the structure in
place to catch it. The SEC is not driven to hurt public companies or to drive
them out of business (or at least out of public registration). 230 This theory
also acknowledges that as a government agency with limited resources it had
to make choices about where to heavily pursue enforcement, and the SEC has
been "a little busy" since 2002.231
However, in looking at the five actions brought in 2007, an interesting
trend is revealed that raises doubt about the SEC's enforcement. In every one
of these actions the CEO or the CFO, or both, have been a direct participant
in the corporate fraud, and have assumed the role of the typical villain.232
Hopefully, the SEC is using this provision in these cases as a first step in
introducing this penalty into the enforcement arena, because to limit
enforcement to only those who have committed fraud effectively changes
nothing in enforcement and encourages CEOs and CFOs to turn a blind eye
to potential corporate misconduct and proceed with business as usual. Some
increased amount of enforcement under Section 304 is needed if the
229For support of this see U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson's comments:
"[I]mplementation has proven more costly and burdensome than originally
anticipated... risk-based implementation will be a positive step.... Another emerging
challenge is the soaring number of financial restatements ... in 2006, there were 1,876,
or more than 10 per cent of public companies. Restatements pose significant costs on our
capital markets [and] have the potential to confuse investors and erode public
confidence .... Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Treasury Secretary, The Key Test of
Accurate Financial Reporting is Trust, FINANCIAL TIMEf s, May 17, 2007,
http://www.treasury.gov/press/ releases/hp407.htm. The idea that the delay in the
enforcement of Section 304 is based on the SEC's perception that companies need time to
adjust to new auditing requirements, therefore, it logically seems to flow from this
discussion that, now, since companies are complying with Sarbanes-Oxley § 404 and
have implemented the costly internal auditing procedures, the number of actions brought
under Section 304 will substantially increase.
230 Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) ("the
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation."). See also CURRENT
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 167, at 16 ("The agency generally has received praise for both
its attempts at balanced regulatory policy and the tough but fair enforcement of the
statutes and rules it administers.").
231 Bloomenthal, supra note 46, at * 13 ("The Commission to the extent it has
limited resources may have to establish different priorities, even if it means that blatant
violations of the securities laws go unpunished.").
232 See supra Part III.C. at notes 141 & 142.
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provision is going to promote the proper incentives and have the correct
amount of deterrent effect.233
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REVISION: Do POTENTIAL CHANGES
CHANGE Too MUCH?
While the SEC continues to be resistant to any proactive use of Section
304 or any clarifying action to address the ambiguities raised in Part III.A.,
the same is not entirely true of Congress. Within the past year, two bills have
been introduced that, if enacted, would dramatically revise Section 304 of
Sarbanes-Oxley. This Part will look at Senate Bill 2866 and House Bill 6987,
and analyze the changes and their likely effect if the language of the Bill
were to be implemented as currently written.234
A. Senate Bill 2866
On April 15, 2008, Democrat Senator Hillary Clinton from New York
introduced Senate Bill 2866, which, if enacted, would amend the current text
of Section 304.235 This bill is the first affirmative attempt to address the
ambiguities and problems with the enforcement of Section 304. However,
this proposed legislation makes radical and potentially detrimental changes to
some parts, while totally ignoring ambiguities in other parts.
If Section 3 of Senate Bill 2866 was enacted as written, the amended text
of 15 U.S.C. § 7243 would read as follows:
(a) Additional compensation prior to noncompliance with Commission
financial reporting requirements.
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the
material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any
financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief
executive officer and chief financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the
issuer for-
(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation
received by that person from the issuer during the 36-month period
following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission
233 See CURRENT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 167, at 14 ("Commissioner Goldshmid
maintained... '[e]ffective deterrence requires a strong, credible threat [of enforcement],'
and that '[p]enalties must sting if they are to be effective."') (citations omitted).
234 This Note was last revised on January 22, 2009. As of that date there has been no
committee discussion on S. 2866 or H.R. 6987, and neither Bill has been discharged
from, or recommended out of, Committee.
235 154 CoNG. REC. S3025-26 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2008) (introduction of S. 2866 by
Sen. Reid for Sen. Clinton).
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(whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such
financial reporting requirement; and
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during
that 36-month period.
(b) RULEMAKING TO IMPROVE ENFORCEMENT.-
(1) IN GENERAL. Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of
the Corporate Executive Compensation Accountability and Transparency
Act, the Commission shall develop and issue regulations to ensure more
effective enforcement of subsection (a). In developing the regulations
required under this paragraph, the Commission shall provide a comment
period not to exceed 60 days.
(2) REQUIRED INCLUSIONS. The regulations required under paragraph
(1) shall, at a minimum, clarify-
(A) that the term 'misconduct' includes misconduct that results from-
(i) specific illicit actions of a senior executive or officer, including the
chief executive officer and chief financial officer, of a company, or
knowledge of illicit actions, accompanied by willful inaction to address
such illicit actions; or
(ii) the willful concealment by such executive or officer, of illicit
actions; and
(B) that the term 'illicit action' includes any of the following activities:
(i) Backdating stock options to conceal liabilities, losses, or any other
negative financial information from shareholders and investors.
(ii) Accounting irregularities designed to conceal losses, liabilities, or
other negative financial information from shareholders, boards of directors,
or government regulators, that are required to be disclosed under this Act,
or any other Act, regulation, or rule governing securities.
(iii) Accounting irregularities designed to artificially achieve profit or
other financial targets that would not have reasonably been met under
generally accepted accounting principles and industry standards, or through
compliance with-
(I) this Act, or any other Act, regulation, or rule governing securities;
and
(II) any provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(iv) Willfully circumventing the reporting, independence, due
diligence, disclosure or fiduciary requirements and obligations of this Act,
or any other Act, regulation, or rule governing securities in order to mislead,
deceive, or withhold information that is required to be given to
shareholders, boards of directors, and Federal and State regulatory
authorities.
(v) Any conduct that violates, or is in conflict with, the legal and
fiduciary responsibilities of the senior executive or officer to the
shareholders and boards of directors of such executive or officer.
(c) REPORT.-Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the
Corporate Executive Compensation Accountability and Transparency Act,
the Chair of the Commission shall issue a report-
[Vol. 70:195
SARBANES-OXLEY
(1) analyzing the current enforcement efforts of the Commission in
regards to this section; and
(2) listing the legislative, regulatory, or administrative
recommendations of the Commission on how to remove any current barriers
to effective enforcement of this section.
(d) COMMISSION EXEMPTION AUTHORITY.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-The Commission may exempt any person from the
application of subsection (a), as it deems necessary and appropriate.
(2) NOTICE.-If the Commission exempts any person pursuant to its
authority under paragraph (1), the Commission shall, not later than 15 days
after such exemption is granted, issue a public statement explaining the
factors surrounding the granting of such exemption and shall notify the
chairperson and ranking minority member of the appropriate committees of
Congress. 23
6
This Author believes that the changes the proposed Amendment would
implement can be broken down, by effect, into four independent categories,
each of which will be analyzed in turn. These categories are: Time Period
and Purpose; Clarification of "Misconduct"; Call for SEC Regulation and
Enforcement; and Notice Accompanying Exemption.
1. Changing the Time Frame: Unlinking the Cause and Effect
The first and most drastic change present in the purposed amendment is
the change from "12-month" to "36-month. '237 This is surprising because a
three-year period of forfeiture does not appear to be readily tied to any period
of time related to the restated filing, the triggering event.238 Each year
publicly traded companies must complete and certify their annual SEC
filing,239 therefore, a restated yearly filing seemed tied to the one-year period
that the misleading information would have covered. A 12-month period of
forfeiture is consistent with the notion that the funds being lost (designated as
performance incentives) are being forfeited because the executive did not
perform during that year, and their poor performance led to an incorrect
yearly filing.240 A change to a three-year forfeiture period appears to enact a
236 For the exact language of the proposed amendment see Corporate Executive
Compensation Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 2866, 110th Cong. § 3 (2008)
(emphasis added).
237 S. 2866, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2008).
238 Cf Elaine Buckberg & Frederick C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands
and Remedial Offers, 63 Bus. Law. 347, 355 (2008) ("[C]ourts [have] found that the
disgorged amount must be causally connected to the violation.... ").239 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (2006).
240 One should note that this interpretation is different than a disgorgement
approach. With disgorgement one only forfeits "ill-gotten gains," or the amount that
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highly punitive penalty, closely akin to treble damages in tort.241 If this is the
intended effect, this change seems to alter the statutory intent to that of a
punitive penalty, rather than an equitable disgorgement, though both types of
remedies would achieve deterrence of future bad acts, and encourage
statutory compliance. 242
However, the proposed language of other parts of the amendment
confuses the issue. The title of Section 3 is: "Executive Reimbursement of
Compensation for Misconduct. ' 243 This title seems to suggest that this
provision is intended to reimburse the issuer, and is no longer intended to be
a penalty or incentive. Additional support for a reimbursement interpretation
can be found in the language of (b)(2), defining "misconduct," which limit
liability to acts or omissions. 244 Reimbursement (or disgorgement) forfeitures
are expected to be tied to a calculated measure of unjust enrichment,
stemming from an act or omission.245 Changing the current statute in such a
way would alter the originally intended purpose. A "36-month" period of
forfeiture provides a set amount, similar to the penalty found in Section
906,246 rather than a variable amount which is calculated from the effect the
defective restatement had on the stock value. Changing the time period in
such a manner would be at direct odds with a policy of reimbursement of
money lost.
Additionally, this alteration in the time period of forfeiture does not
address or resolve the previous problems with the value of vesting
incentives. 247 Further, this provision actually complicates the matter in that
"compensation and bonuses[] are artificially increased by puffed-up corporate
performance." Buckberg & Dunbar, supra note 238, at 349 (calculating disgorgement as
a "net economic gain"). Reimbursement would be more typically a return of something
earned to which one was not entitled, thus covering the entire yearly incentive based
compensation and bonuses.
241 Treble damages in tort are a punitive remedy, and "Disgorgement Should Not Be
Punitive." Id. at 350.
242 Id. at 350-51.
243 Corporate Executive Compensation Accountability and Transparency Act,
S. 2866, 110th Cong. § 3 (2008).
244 S. 2866, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2) (2008).
245 It is unclear whether Reimbursement or disgorgement is actually intended here.
See discussion supra note 242. Cf Buckberg & Dunbar, supra note 238, at 350 n.16
(unjust enrichment).
246 A three-year forfeiture period could be viewed as a superior penalty to that in
Section 906, because, like the current statute, it is a penalty that is proportional to the
wealth of the company and earnings of the corporate executive, avoiding the perception
that the penalty is either overly burdensome or nominally deterrent. See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ($ 5 million dollar penalty).
247 See discussion supra note 104 on benefits received, but not vested during the
statutory time period.
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now with a three-year period of time, successive restatements could lead to
significant overlap, with either under- or over- recovery. 248 A three-year
period is no longer tied to the yearly certification, and could penalize a newly
hired executive, who may have participated in the yearly audit and filing for
the current year, but who was not even present, much less responsible for the
two prior years. Ultimately, the inconsistency between the perceived intent
and implemented means appears to add rather than alleviate ambiguity.
2. Definition of "Misconduct": Clarification or Alteration?
S. 2866 seeks to resolve the major source of ambiguity (and potential
barrier to enforcement) found in the statutory term "misconduct.' '249
However, in defining the term, the Bill alters the nature of the statute by
restricting the liability to "illicit actions" or "willful inaction to address such
illicit actions" or "willful concealment. '250 The use of the term "willful"
suggests that there is a knowledge or an intent requirement,251 and no longer
applies to a situation where the executive has imputed knowledge, or should
have known. 252 However, when viewed in context with the proposed
definition of "illicit action" and the catch-all found in subsection "v" which
encompasses conduct "in conflict with, the legal and fiduciary
responsibilities," 253 it is possible that this provision can be read consistently
with imputed knowledge and a standard that would encompass liability for
recklessness or inattentiveness.254 It is also possible that since the definition
is found in a section mandating rulemaking, the level of liability enumerated
248 If this is not tied to a yearly filing, but instead covers three years from the date of
restatement, an additional problem of calculation and duplicate recovery is created. For
example, if a company were to file a restatement two years in a row, is the forfeiture
amount is equal to six years of bonuses or four years of bonuses with an off-set.
249 Corporate Executive Compensation Accountability and Transparency Act,
S. 2866, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(2) (2008).
250 S. 2866, § (3)(b)(2)(A).
251 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (8th ed. 2004) (defined as "Voluntary and
intentional," and further states "The word 'wilful' or 'wilfully' when used in the
definition of a crime... means only intentionally or purposely as distinguished from
accidentally or negligently and does not require any actual impropriety .... ).
252 One should note that the bill expands the coverage to all senior executives or
officers not only the CEO and CFO. S. 2866, at § (3)(b)(2)(A)(i).
253 S. 2866, § (3)(b)(2)(B)(v).
254 To be consistent with the underlying purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley, Section 304
should be read to include liability for recklessness, or where one should have known of
misconduct because of an inherent duty to investigate. Cf ROBERT R. MOELLER,
SARBANES-OXLEY INTERNAL CONTROLS 186-88 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008).
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here is a floor that can be expanded rather than implementing a exclusive
enumeration. 255
Yet, one of the most interesting features of this bill is that the
congressional intent clearly recognizes the ambiguity in the term
"misconduct" and seeks to leave the clarification of this term to those with
the most skill and familiarity with the law in the area, the SEC.2 5 6 If
Congress is currently prepared to defer to the SEC's expertise, and the SEC
has the power to clarify the issue, this portion of the Bill merely emphasizes
the SEC's current failure to act.
3. Requirement of Notice After Exemption
The final addition of the public notice of reasoning for exemption adds
additional clarification to the SEC's understanding of its statutory role, but
does not definitively resolve any of the original ambiguity surrounding this
Section. The notice requirement appears to reinforce the holdings of the
courts, following Neer v. Pelino, which held that there is no private right of
action, because now the SEC must justify its actions for exempting someone
from a Section 304 action.257 Providing justification to the public appears to
be an attempt to establish a precedent of acceptable and unacceptable
conduct under the section, clarifying the boundaries of the section.258
However, this also seems to confuse the process for exemption, making it
unclear whether this provision is intended (or ever was intended) to impose
automatic liability to the filing of the restatement due to misconduct.
Additionally, the language used confuses the intended frequency with which
the exemption authority should be used, further calling into question the
extent and procedures for enforcement under this Section. 259 The bill
255 It is not clear that the term "misconduct" would be limited to only that which is
expressed here, rather the standard is the minimum. See S. 2866, 11 0th Cong. at §
(3)(b)(2)(A) (2008)--"[r]egulations required under paragraph (1) shall, at a minimum,
clarify that.., the term 'misconduct' includes ... " It uses the term "includes" but not "is
defined as"-leaving room open for other understandings to also be included.
256 The definition appears in Section b which is entitled "RULEMAKING TO IMPROVE
ENFORCEMENT." S. 2866, at § (3)(b)(2)(B).
257 Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005). See also In re BISYS
Group Inc. Deriv. Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Kogan v.
Robinson, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
258 It is unclear whether the justifications provided to Congress would create a
standard of precedent with a stronger value than that of No-Action Letters, (i.e. pseudo-
case law), or a weaker value than Staff Interpretational Guidance.
259 Compare S. 2866, at § (3)(d)(1), with S. 2866, at § (3)(d)(2). The attempt by
Congress to require public notice, in what appears to be an attempt to define the
appropriate conduct that should be subject to exemption, seems to confuse defining the
exemption authority with defining the scope of the law and clarifying potential defenses
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attempts to improve clarity and understanding, but should include an express
statutory mandate that the SEC is the only body that can bring these claims,
and that there is no private right of action in order to remove any outstanding
doubt or confusion.260
4. A Call to Action and Demand for Reports and Regulations
The proposed amendment to Section 304 would accomplish one
significant and positive change; it would force the SEC to act. Section "b"
calling for clarifying regulations 261 and Section "c" calling for an internal
assessment of barriers to enforcement262 demand from the SEC the very
action for which this Note is advocating.263 This Author fears that this
proposed amendment would alter the optimal interpretation of Section 304,
changing its purpose and effect, yet the proposed legislation has identified
numerous current problems and is seeking to take corrective action. For this
the legislative effort should be commended. The proposed legislation has
identified the optimal means of corrective action: forcing the agency to issue
regulations and evaluate enforcement efforts-ironically, action that is totally
within the SEC's current power.
B. House of Representatives Bill 6987
For the sake of a complete discussion, the second proposed congressional
amendment to Section 304 must be briefly analyzed. The second bill,
H.R. 6987,264 was introduced in the House on September 22, 2008.265 Unlike
Senate Bill 2866, H.R. 6987 does not alter any of the language that is
currently in Section 304, and does not seek to resolve any of the currently
existing ambiguities. 266 It instead would add a third subsection following the
existing text to extend the scope of the forfeiture penalty to cover any
executive of a company that is receiving a taxpayer bailout.267 If House Bill
6987 were enacted as currently written, it would introduce many
and justifiable executive actions. Exemption is a discretionary accommodation, not an
avenue of defense to the violation. Id. One serves to clarify the other but the standard is
not identical, nor should it be.
260 See Part III.A.4 supra.
261 S. 2866, 110th Cong. at § 3(b) (2008).
262 S. 2866, at § 3(c).
263 See infra Part VI.
264 H.R. 6987, 110th Cong. (2008).
265 See 154 CONG. REc. H8577-03 (2008) (statement of Rep. Feeney).
2 6 6 See supra Part lHI.A.
267 See H.R. 6987, 110th Cong., at preamble.
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inconsistencies between the subsections of Section 304. Additionally, when
the proposed text is read in conjunction with the old text, the proposed
language would provide a harsher penalty to those executives who lack fault
than is applied to those who are potentially at fault in causing the
restatement.
If House Bill 6987 were enacted as written, the relevant parts of Section
304 would read as follows:
(a) ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION PRIOR TO NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
COMMISSION FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.-If an issuer is
required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material
noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial
reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer
and chief financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for-
(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation
received by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period
following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission
(whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such
financial reporting requirement; and
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during
that 12-month period.
(b) COMMISSION EXEMPTION AUTHORITY.-The Commission may
exempt any person from the application of subsection (a), as it deems
necessary and appropriate.
(c) REPAYMENT OF BONUS IN CASE OF TAXPAYER BAILOUT.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-An officer of an issuer shall pay to the Department
of the Treasury any amounts received by such officer during a year as a
bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation from the
issuer during-
(A) a year in which the issuer is subject to a taxpayer bailout; and
(B) the two years prior to a year in which the issuer is subject to a
taxpayer bailout.268
This bill would create the same problem with the penalty and time frame
for forfeiture as S. 2866 creates. 269 However, this proposed amendment goes
further. The Bill does not merely change the previous understandings and
policies of the original Sarbanes-Oxley legislation; it actually creates
inconsistent applications between the subsections of the same statute (e.g.
Subsection (a) applied to the CEO and CFO while Subsection (c) applies to
268 See H.R. 6987, 110th Cong., Sec. 2 (2008). Taxpayer Bailout is later defined as a
company being placed under some form of treasury control or supervision, or receipt of
an emergency loan of public funds "to prevent the imminent failure of the issuer." Id.
2 6 9 See Part V.A. I supra.
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all officers), without any apparent justification for the inconsistencies.270
Implementing subsection (c) would create an incongruous result that could
not be intended under public policy. The penalty for being a CEO of a
company that is having financial difficulties and becomes subject to a bailout
is similar to treble damages, or the loss of three years of incentive
compensation. Treble damages alone are not problematic, 271 but without
revising the language or understanding of Subsection (a), CEOs who actually
are responsible for the misconduct that led to the restatement would only
forfeit one year's incentive compensation and bonuses.272 This inconsistency
would create a disincentive for competent CEOs and CFOs to accept
positions with companies that might currently be financially unstable, if there
is even the remote possibility that the issuer might become subject to a
bailout. It is unclear if this type of a penalty would be an appropriate addition
to the forfeiture provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, given that there is no CEO
conduct that could affect the attachment of liability.273 Serious revision, or
the addition of conforming amendments, should be considered before
Congress takes any further action with this Bill.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is highly doubtful that there will ever be such a perfect regulatory
scheme that will accomplish total fraud prevention,274 but the SEC's
haphazard enforcement of Section 304 is simply neglectful. The SEC should
270 See proposed statutory text supra pp. 39-41.
271 The forfeiture of three year's pay under this proposal likely stems from a policy
of market protection, and a general sense that if the issuer is failing financially, and the
taxpayers are having to pay to remedy the problem, the individual in charge of the failing
company should not retain the large incentives he or she given to promote financial
success.
272 It appears illogical to punish a CEO who may have had nothing to do with the
financial instability of the company (especially in the case of a bailout, which is usually
caused by unstable market conditions), three times as severely as one who may actually
have perpetrated a fraud against the issuer.
273 It appears that both houses of Congress are favoring a forfeiture provision that
functions as a penalty akin to treble damages. H.R. 6987, 110th Cong. § 2(c)(1)(A) & (B)
(2008); S. 2866, 110th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2008). Such harsh punishment does not seem to
be appropriate in all scenarios that would be covered by Section 304. Congress may want
to consider modifying future legislation to create two levels of penalties that could be
invoked based on the level of liability of the executive. For example, fraud or misconduct
that is knowingly committed by the executive could merit a 36-month forfeiture period,
where as inattentiveness would invoke only the lesser 12-month forfeiture period.
274 See Johnson & White, supra note 140, at D7 ("[E]xperts stressed that crooks
bent on stealing from a company will still take their chances and some will succeed.
Regulators can never pass laws that will force executives to act with integrity .... ).
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not delay enforcement of the current statute on the outside chance that
Congress will enact a new statute, especially when the power to resolve
ambiguity and enforce the statute is well within the SEC's agency powers. 275
The SEC must provide guidance and clarity, creating a clear expectation of
the statute's attendant liability, in order for enforcement to obtain maximum
effectiveness. No statute can truly be effective if it does not provide adequate
notice of prohibited conduct. The SEC should clarify its overall enforcement
strategy and goals, and then take calculated steps towards enforcement
actions that directly accomplish its policy objectives. Because to do nothing,
and to leave executives guessing in the dark, is simply deplorable
abandonment of valuable fraud prevention tools.
A. Issue Clear Interpretive Guidance to Resolve Statutory Ambiguity
The first step the SEC should take toward effective Section 304
enforcement is to issue clear interpretive guidance on the elements of the
cause of action. The business community needs definition in order to
anticipate appropriately liability and price risk,276 allowing for an efficient
calculation of due diligence. Thus, while the SEC has an interest in avoiding
simple "boilerplate disclosures," 277 it must be cautious of the fear that
uncertain enforcement can create in the business community.278
The SEC should issue regulations that specifically resolve the textual
ambiguities of Section 304, with specific attention being given to the
meaning of the terms "required" and "misconduct." Several proposed
275 The SEC has rulemaking authority to facilitate the implementation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2002)
("The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out this subchapter."). Even a
staff interpretation would provide additional guidance on the scope of Section 304.
276 Businesses need to be able to anticipate liabilities if they are going to properly
function and actually reach a point of confidence that they have met appropriate
standards for compliance.
277 SEC Action: Final Rule, Executive Compensation and Related Person
Disclosure, at II.B. 1, File No. S7-03-06, Aug 29, 2006, effective Nov. 7, 2006, 2006 SEC
LEXIS 2016 (SEC 2006) at *41, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8809.pdf (The
Commission stated while adopting the revised rules that "[t]he purpose of
the... disclosure is to provide material information about.., objectives and
policies... without resorting to boilerplate disclosure.").
278 CURRENT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 167, at 19 ("The Commission is seen as
increasingly attempting to impose shifting standards of conduct and liability through
enforcement proceedings. This reportedly has caused a sense of uncertainty to envelop
the business community, along with a fear that the Commission will impose a standard of
liability that has not been clearly enunciated.").
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definitions have been put forth for when a restatement is "required, ' 279 but
by using an interpretation that relies both on the internal controls and audit
procedures to identify the misconduct, it places the ultimate burden back on
the CEO and CFO to acknowledge an accounting discrepancy and take
appropriate remedial action to correct material misstatements.280 It also
creates a policy incentive for the CEO and CFO to ensure issuer compliance
and to carry out their monitoring functions diligently, so that the misconduct
and accounting irregularities are discovered and remedied before material
information is disclosed in quarterly reports.
When defining the term "misconduct" the SEC should give special
attention to the level and form of liability imposed by different language and
meanings. At least four possible levels of liability have arisen from academic
analysis of this term: (1) direct liability for "personal culpability;"'281 (2)
liability for "inattentiveness" or negligent supervision, or what one "should
have known," which would encompass a standard of recklessness akin to that
found in several provisions of the 1934 Act;282 (3) remote liability, where
either the negligent or intentional action of a remote employee can constitute
enough misconduct to impose liability;283 and (4) strict liability, allowing no
affirmative defense for reasonable investigation or due diligence. There is
little argument that direct liability should be included in the standard for
"misconduct," given that it is this standard which punishes the atrocious
fraudsters who deliberately set out to defraud the market and the public. 284 If
liability were to stop there, the effect being given to the text would appear to
be narrower than the text appears on its face.285 Liability for inattentiveness
should be included in the definition of misconduct due to the policy goal of
providing the public with reliable information; the justification is that an
279 Fraidin et al., supra note 37, at 56.
280 Eigenbrodt, supra note 81, at 2 (defining as "'required' when the restatement is
necessary for an issuer's auditors to issue their opinion on the financial statements.. .
See supra Part III.B.
281 See generally, Kelsh, supra note 38.
282 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006) (reasonable care).
283 It is generally inconsistent with the understanding of the term misconduct that
derived liability from an innocent mistake. See Dawes & Johnson, supra note 30, at 116.
284 This provision would be meaningless without punishing those who, through their
intentional conduct, are little better than street thugs. Direct liability is also wholly
consistent with other anti-fraud penalties found in Sarbanes-Oxley. See Rule 1Ob-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2008).
285 Congress in drafting Section 304 could have written subsection (a) as:
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material
noncompliance of the issuer, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities
laws, as a result of misconduct by the chief executive officer or chief financial officer of
the issuer, or both, then that officer shall reimburse the issuer for ....
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inattentive officer is not exercising enough care to satisfy the knowledge
requirement. 286 Including the second standard suggests that the appropriate
level of liability is recklessness, which definitively removes the defense of
ignorance, but retains a form of the affirmative defense of due diligence.287
By including the due diligence defense, the standard of liability becomes
flexible and adaptive.2 88 There is somewhat of a gray area between the
second and third standards (due to the standard given to "should have
known"), which exists on a sliding scale of remoteness of relationship versus
severity of misconduct.289 The appropriate definition for misconduct falls
somewhere in the gray area, and ultimately judicial decision would define the
outer bounds.290 To include the fourth standard of liability would produce
disincentives for officers to diligently monitor disclosures,291 and would only
expand market fear over unreliable enforcement.
The SEC needs to be explicit when describing a Section 304 action. By
merely taking those steps the SEC will allow the business community to
286 See Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of
SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 703, 706 (2007) ("Congress... reasonably concluding
that executive certification would be more meaningful and persuasive to investors if those
executives had reasonable grounds to believe that the internal financial controls on the
process producing those numbers were solid.").
287 This is consistent with the § 302 certification requirement that the certifier is
attesting "to the best of his knowledge." See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15
U.S.C. § 7241 (2006).
288 Recklessness and due diligence are terms which could be defined by regulations
or develop an understood meaning through SEC adjudication and case law. This type of
standard is one that can shift to accommodate different factual scenarios as well as
historical developments in precedent.
289 Thus as the relationship of the person committing the misconduct becomes more
attenuated (e.g., a manager of a small overseas subsidiary, whom the CEO has never met)
the more egregious the misconduct must be for liability to attach (e.g., blatantly
misappropriating a significant percentage of corporate funds to pay for a forty-foot
personal yacht). See Carney, supra note 86, at 144 ("The earliest change imposed by
SOX on executives involved the section 302 requirement that Chief Executive Officers
(CEO) and Chief Financial Officers (CFO) certify the accuracy of financial statements.
This has created a daisy chain effect in which these officers require lower-level
employees to certify accuracy of those portions of the financials for which they are
responsible, and is creating a practice of a series of meetings down the line to discuss
control issues.") (citations omitted).
290 CURRENT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 167, at 37-38 ("[T]here is concern that the
SEC is taking enforcement actions designed to raise those standards based on the
Commission's view, after the fact, of what corporate officers... 'should have' done or
'should have' recognized, and that the view being imposed greatly diminishes the ability
of managers to function without fear of being second-guessed when they rely in good
faith on the involvement of competent subordinates .... ) (citations omitted).
291 Cf Said, supra note 213, at D1.
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anticipate executive exposure and to put into place firm policies targeted at
preventing the misconduct that might trigger the exposure. No market can
function if governed by rules that are vague or inconsistently applied.292 It is
firmly believed that that no firm wants to violate the Sarbanes-Oxley
requirements; 293 rather, they just are not clear on what the requirements are,
and what minimum threshold they must meet to escape liability.294
B. Develop Comprehensive Enforcement Policies and Guidelines
The second recommendation is integrally connected to the first. The SEC
needs to determine what the optimal outcome for enforcement of Section 304
should be, and then should "undertake a comprehensive study of its
enforcement processes and policies, to ensure that the rights and interests of
all those constituencies that work within the framework of regulation. . . are
adequately considered and protected during the enforcement process," 295 and
that the enforcement is effected in a manner that focuses on the harm that
Congress intended to remedy by the enactment of the Section 304 language.
Once the interpretational ambiguities are resolved, the statutory text of
Section 304 should become the framework for enforcement, detailing the
elements of the cause of action, the burden of proof, the threshold for
liability, and the potential for an affirmative defense.
As part of these guidelines, the SEC should explicitly address the issue
of the existence of a private right of action. The courts have given their
292 CURRENT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 167, at 15 ("[T]he threat of harsh, punitive
sanctions for violations based on complex and unclear legal and accounting principles,
and the over criminalization of securities law violations, can stifle creativity and
legitimate risk-taking and create a liability-imbued and uncertain environment in which
to do business."). See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978)) ("To
survive judicial scrutiny, an agency's construction need not be the only reasonable
interpretation or even the most reasonable interpretation. Rather, a court must defer to an
agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred
another."
293 Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 80, at 9 ("business leaders might want to act but
are unsure how").
294 CURRENT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 167, at 23 ("SEC Commissioner Cynthia
Glassman stated that she favors continuing 'to push for more focus on encouraging good
outcomes proactively rather than looking for violations after the fact,' ... '[b]y setting
clear standards, we can make it easier for regulated entities to comply with our
rules .... ') (quoting Cynthia A. Glassman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC
Commissioner: SEC in Transition: What We've Done and What's Ahead (June 15,
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch06l505cag.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2008)).
295 CURRENT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 167, at 40.
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support for the interpretation that no private right of action exists under
Section 304, and the SEC has begun to enforce such actions, allowing the
market to draw such a conclusion. But a definitive statement of the policy in
this area would save the plaintiffs' bar the aggravation of having to plead
frivolous claims out of fear of repercussions. 296 The SEC must ultimately
find the appropriate balance of enforcement and harm to instill in this statute
the correct deterrent effect. 297 "What is needed is a legal regime that
motivates corporate actors to commit to legal compliance rather than to seek
ways to avoid or evade the law," 298 but this can never be fully accomplished
if the SEC continues to enforce Section 304 in an erratic and unpredictable
manner.
299
VII. CONCLUSION
To find corporate misconduct requires having someone on the inside
motivated to look for it. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act realized this, but one still
has to wonder if it effectively created this motivation.300 If enforcement
under Section 304 is not either increased or revised in the coming years, then
the public would be naYve to believe that the either the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
or the SEC has successfully protected them against corporate misconduct and
ensured them full disclosure.30 1 However, this Author is hopeful that the
SEC will shortly promulgate regulations that will clarify the statutory text of
296 This would also add a level of clarity that might prevent an end-run around the
statute by bringing such claims in arbitration. See Om Group, Inc. v. Mooney, No. 2:05-
cv-546-FtM-33SPC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1446, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2006);
discussion supra note 116.
297 Cf CURRENT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 167, at 37-38 ("[T]here is concern that
the SEC is taking enforcement actions designed to raise those standards based on the
Commission's view, after the fact, of what corporate officers... 'should have' done or
'should have' recognized, and that the view being imposed greatly diminishes the ability
of managers to function without fear of being second-guessed when they rely in good
faith on the involvement of competent subordinates, counsel, or other experts." (citations
omitted)).
298 Di Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 795.
299 CURRENT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 167, at 19 ("The Commission is seen as
increasingly attempting to impose shifting standards of conduct and liability through
enforcement proceedings. This reportedly has caused a sense of uncertainty to envelop
the business community, along with a fear that the Commission will impose a standard of
liability that has not been clearly enunciated.").
300 Coffee, Jr., supra note 61, at 337 ("Arguably then, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
represents an incomplete response-relevant in its desire to reduce agent conflicts of
interest, but still not sufficient to the extent that underdeterrance [sic] remains the
problem.").
301 Di Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 793-97.
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Section 304, and that future enforcement actions will target those inattentive
officers who have failed to find the corporate misconduct being perpetrated
right under their noses.

